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Abstract 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are taken into account as some of the most usable prac-
tices for firm development and expansion. These practices have commonly been utilized in 
European countries while are often used. This research directs to examine the effect of 
M&A on stock wealth of banking industry in Europe by using event study analysis for the 
period of 2007–2016, regarding 114 deals. Market Model was used to calculate the abnor-
mal and cumulative abnormal returns for analyzing the three event periods and the impact 
of the transaction in stock performance. The research disclose composite findings regard-
ing mergers and acquisitions and their stock prices performance. Our results shown that 
most of the companies performed negative abnormal returns while some others have pro-
duced positive abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns after transaction period. All in 
all, the results indicate  that the market make a positive response towards M&A transac-
tions in banking sector of Europe. Especially, shareholders of target firms earn positive 
abnormal returns, after the announcement. The findings would be beneficial in suppling 
awareness to the investors and management regarding their investment decisions. 
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Introduction 
 
All over the time, corporations need economic resources to extend and expand their 
operations or growth. Growth can be accomplished through launching new products and 
services or expanding operations beyond the existing resources. There are two assets used 
for reaching growth, internal resources and external resources. The business organizations 
commonly depend on internal sources for expansion of their business. However, any 
considerable growth opportunity will stimulate organizations to count on external resources 
if there are constrained internal resources. 
The external sources may consist of loans from banks, partnerships, mergers with other 
companies or obtaining another organization. The Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) are 
the emerging strategies adopted for enlargement of the businesses in the corporate world. 
Due to its rapid growth, many organizations have adopted such strategies for expanding 
their business, and about four thousand transactions are recorded each year in the business 
world. 
Since the second half of the 1990s, we have been witnessing an unprecedented wave of 
mergers and acquisitions in Europe. Globalization and increased competition have 
contributed to the rise of mergers and acquisitions of large firms, which are also influenced 
by a series of technological innovative changes. These mergers and acquisitions are not 
confined to the industrial sector so alone, but rather of concern to overall economy and 
particularly the banking sector. 
Moreover, deregulation and acceleration of economic innovation process have favored the 
complexity of varieties of financing mergers and acquisitions and have given the 
shareholders a key role within the implementation of such operations. This trend is 
primarily due to technological and financial innovations, the international movement of 
financial deregulation, the process of financial integration in Europe, favorable economic 
and financial conditions and eventually necessity to create value for the shareholders. The 
advent of shareholder value currently remains the essential objective of these mergers and 
acquisitions. However, the overwhelming majority of mergers and acquisitions have 
occurred within national borders (domestic M &A), whereas since 2005 a few took place 
across borders (border M & A). 
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Investments across all asset classes often are accompanied by excessive opportunities, but 
they involve many risks. One of the main reasons behind any strategic corporate decision is 
to maximize the shareholder value. However, the prime strategic choices for firms are 
mostly, if not probably, M&As. Mergers and acquisitions not only affect the value of the 
merging firms, but they also produce a positive or negative wealth effect for the 
shareholders of the involved companies. Consequently, shareholders of target firms attain a 
positive wealth effect while shareholders of  acquiring firms produce a negative wealth 
effect. Nonetheless, the outcome of such M&A deals is ambiguous. 
This study aims to explore the financial performance of European banks and Financial 
institutions, which have been involved in mergers and acquisitions deals, and examines the 
impact of merger or acquisition announcements on acquiring and target firms' stock 
performance. This thesis examines a total of 114 completed M&A transactions from 2007 
to 2016 in Europe. 
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1. Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Even though they are often used like they were synonymous, the terms “merger” and 
“acquisition” have a slight difference in their meaning. A merger happens when two 
separate entities (usually of a comparable size) combine forces to create a new, joint 
organization in which both are equal partners. An acquisition refers to the obtaining of 
one organization by another. A new company does not emerge from an M&A transaction 
rather, the acquired company or the target firm, is absorbed and manages to exist, as its 
assets become part of the acquiring company. Acquisitions generally carry a more 
negative connotation than mergers, especially if the target firm shows resistance to being 
bought. As a result, many acquiring companies refer to an acquisition as a merger even 
when technically it is not.(Investopedia,2018) 
In general, a merger requires two firms to consolidate into a new corporation by 
establishing a new ownership status and management structure .An acquisition happens 
once one firm takes over all of the management decisions of another. The most common 
revelatory distinction lies on whether the takeover is friendly (merger) or hostile 
(acquisition) . 
Practically, friendly mergers of equals firms happen rarely. It is unusual that two 
companies would benefit from uniting forces, or even two different management 
approaches come closer to realize mutual opportunities. When this phenomenon take 
place, the shares of merging firms are surrendered and new stocks are published under 
the name of the new corporation identity. 
Due to the fact that  mergers are so occasional and acquisitions seems harsh to take 
place, the two terms (M&A) have become more and more mixed and used in 
concurrence with each other. Contemporary corporate modifications are typically 
referred to as merger and acquisition (M&A) deals rather than simply a merger or 
acquisition. The main difference focuses on how the acquisition is communicated to and 
deceived by the target firm's management and employees. The public relations criticism 
for hostile takeovers are often damaging to the bidding firm. The targets of hostile 
transactions are usually obligated to publicize a merger to maintain the reputation of the 
target firm. (Investopedia,2018)  
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Mergers and acquisitions could be classified based on the kind of a merger. Most 
mergers are merely finalized when one firm obtain another one, but there are several 
motives strategically-oriented behind such a practice. Likewise, legal terminology also 
differs from merger to merger. The process of an acquisition or a merger calls for a 
disciplined approach by the decision makers within the firm. The following parameters 
should be considered: 
 
 Firm should be willing to take risks and make investments in order to profit fully 
from the deal, competitors and also the industry. 
 In order to decrease risk, a couple of bets should be made, since some of the 
initiatives can fail, while some will prove profitable. 
 The management of the bidding company ought to learn to be resilient, patient 
and able to emulate change owing to changing business dynamics in the industry 
(Cleverism,2015). 
. 
1.1 The reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Mergers and acquisitions happen for many strategic reasons, but the most common of 
them are basically economic. Right below are mentioned the main financial reasons: 
 Increasing opportunities: New opportunities may occur from further expansion 
and development. Likewise, firms might want to combine to leverage costly 
manufacturing operations. Opportunity may not just be a specific department, it 
may occur from acquiring a unique technology platform rather than trying to 
create it from scratch. 
 Diversifying products or services: One more factor for merging companies is to 
improve a current product or service. Two firms could combine their products or 
services to acquire a competitive advantage in the market share. 
 Replacing Management: A private firm may need to merge or be acquired if the 
current leadership cannot detect someone within the corporation to succeed them. 
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 Cutting costs: When two firms provide similar products or services, merging them 
can generate a large opportunity to cut costs. When firms merge, they usually have 
the ability to combine locations or reduce operating costs. This financial strategy has 
to do with economies of scale.  
 Surviving: It is not simple for an organization to willingly give up its identity to 
another organization, but sometimes it is the only way for the firm to survive. 
Several companies used mergers and acquisitions to survive during the global 
financial crisis from 2008 to 2012. During the financial crisis, many banks and 
financial institutions merged in order to deleverage failing balance sheets that 
otherwise may have put them out of business. 
Combining firms has some eventual downsides for employees, who have to deal with 
immediate fears concerning employment or business lines, but additionally positive 
sides of merging may include more advantages, or having access to alternative 
resources to do one’s job (Wallstreetoasis, 2015). 
  
1.1.1 The Main Motives behind Takeovers and Mergers 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions happen for a several  reasons that differ in significance 
across  regions, industries, and sectors, similarly as over time. Needless to mention, 
the most prominent reason is synergies, the value achieved from the additional cash 
flows generated or the cash outflows saved by combining two or more firms or going 
concerns. 
There is a statement presented by Johnson & Scholes, who separate the main motives 
for M&A into three categories: 
 Strategic 
 Financial 
 Managerial 
It is undoubtedly true that in a particular M&A deal can be included motives from all 
three of these categories. Nevertheless, it is necessary to identify the prominent 
reason for each transaction, by allocating it to one of the three groups. 
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1.2 Reasons why most mergers destroy shareholder value 
Mergers and acquisitions can be profitable for a firm for several reasons: improving 
existing products or services, amendment of temperament, an entry to international 
markets and acquiring expert employees. One research by KPMG has come to the 
conclusion that quite the half of M&A deals destroys stock value while one third made 
no difference at all. The reasons for unsuccessful transactions contain observable 
accounting and operation failures, but the most complicated reasons deal with people, 
culture and human behaviors. These are also the most tough to correct. 
 
1.2.1 Financial reasons Mergers and Acquisitions fail to add value 
 
 Overvaluation: M&As can cost billions, mistakes cannot solely cripple a bidding 
firm financially by committing its capital resources, but a big  failure can seriously 
injure a firm’s name among shareholders. Aberrant financial practices are the 
primary reason behind overvaluing a M&A deal. In 2013, for example, Caterpillar 
revealed a 580 million dollar accounting charge concerning their bid of China’s 
Siwei, whose management team led Caterpillar to wildly overpay. 
 Intervention: Even when two firms consent to the terms and conditions of an M&A 
deal, third parties with stealthy motives can intervene, adding restrictions which 
deter merger from becoming final and accomplished. Usually, these third parties are 
governments. 
 Distraction: Commonly, distractions that accompany mergers can avert managers 
from focusing on the real business objectives of their firm. During the busiest 
worldwide M&A period leading to a historic peak in 2000, a ground breaking 
Wharton study examined the cost-cutting performance of American banks a long 
time after the merge. Although the reason cited for these mergers was cost-
efficiency, the research found that merged organizations actually cut costs at a much 
slower pace than their peers that remain independent. Counter intuitively, mergers 
seem to avert firms from reaching targets as fast as they would otherwise. 
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 Fear and greed: Mergers, when actuate by concern of failure, rising costs or 
dramatic change are rarely the appropriate reason to merge, and may cause firms to 
aim at transactions for the completely wrong reasons. Copycat mergers arise in 
many industries where major deals are followed by a rash of similar consolidations 
despite the fact that it is usually better to be nimble when the rest of your 
competitors are expanding.(Martinroll,2014) 
 
1.2.2 Cultural reasons mergers fail to add value 
 
M&As are basically a strategic and financial decision, but assuming the relevant 
financial and legal steps are made properly, true success depends on how effectively the 
most important intangible assets of a brand digest. A main object of negotiations is that 
the legal and financial arrangements can give management opportunities such that the 
only human capital decisions made with reliance is who will be the next CEO and who 
will be involved to the new management.  
If cultures are not compatible or managed carefully, the merging may be doomed from 
the beginning.  In several cases, people who have spent their working lives competing 
each other, came together under the new merging company. This is known as a “merger 
of equals” because, on the surface, it brings along two similar types of firms with strong 
market place. In other cases, mergers or acquisitions bring along two different types of 
firms and cultures with a different market position. 
The main issue with most mergers is that they do not actually “merge” as much as they 
put their operations together.  Both firms prefer to co-exist rather than create a new 
organization; therefore, their cultures can stay entrenched.  
When two groups are in conflict, each group becomes more closely knit and coherent, 
unceremoniously demanding additional loyalty to what it believes in order to present a 
united front. Leadership among each group can become more autocratic as the group 
stimulates. As soon as the groups begin to realize themselves as good guys vs. bad guys, 
they only see their strengths, deny their weaknesses, and may ignore the synergies the 
companies are trying to generate. If these stereotypes persist uncorrected, 
communication between groups either decreases or becomes hostile and every future 
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strategic initiative will become a battleground. Infrequently, will a brand with deep-
seeded cultural conflict become the cohesive, highly integrated, synergistic organization 
dreamt of during the early days of a merger. 
Cultural conflicts typically have two results. The first result is when management 
mutually admits defeat and dissolves the merger, as Daimler Chrysler did in 2007, 
selling what was once the third largest auto-maker in the United States. Chrysler would 
file for bankruptcy in 2009. Similarly, Time Warner finally spun off the AOL unit in 
2009 causing record losses. The second result is when the firms do manage to remain 
whole, one brand assumes a supplicate role within the company. Commonly, the 
winning group whose values have been affirmed relaxes while leadership becomes 
maintenance oriented instead of progressive or innovative. On the opposite hand, focus 
within the supplicate group shifts to assigned tasks rather than the greater vision. 
Scapegoating and internal fighting may begin while talent gradually leaks from the 
organization.  In both situations, cultural discrepancies eliminate the merger’s value over 
time and never truly create a competitive advantage. 
If the structural reorganization of an organization is seen as the end, rather than a 
beginning, mergers will undeniably unravel. Great steps must be taken to assure cultural 
compatibility before any legal or financial negotiations begin, otherwise, factions will 
develop along old lines of thinking even when the ink has dried. Merged brands cannot 
simply be bolted on to one another because they intuitively generate synergies – there 
must be a unifying and compelling vision based on shared values and structures around 
which two cultures can join. Without this belief, no amount of legal or financial 
wrangling can make M&As successful. 
 
 
1.2 The Effects of the Financial Crisis on M&A Announcement Returns 
 
The global financial crisis is changing dynamically the landscape for mergers and 
acquisitions and identifying new M&A targets that demonstrate a shift with significant 
impact on our global business practices. Even more now than ever before, firms are 
implementing strategies that include gaining access to new geographies. They are 
corresponding to the crisis by emphasizing on growth outside their home country regions, 
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extending their geographic diversification and investment in alternative markets. Earlier 
M&A activity was concentrated on the triad of US, Europe and Japan, the world’s largest 
consumer markets. However, as the triads share of the global consumer market declines, 
companies are searching for new consumer markets that are expanding and open for 
opportunity. Our study reviews the increased complexity and challenges those cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions' need to address in their attempt to succeed globally in an 
environment of instability fueled by ongoing financial turmoil. New development in 
formulating innovative deal structures and defining creative terms is obvious. Looking 
deeper into the supply chain to identify acquisitions targets is becoming more attractive, 
especially in cross-border M&A deals. 
Diversify risk and maximize control, efficiency and productivity. Increasing the impact of 
shareholders, maximizing legal arrangements and giving consideration to international 
political consequences are all finding their way into the acquirer’s deal structure. Cross-
border M&A is contributing to the change into global political, social and economic 
integration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, there is a discussion of empirical studies which approach the issue of 
M&A from different points of view. Research on the impact of M&A on the wealth 
creation of participating firms is plenty. Firstly, Gort and Harford (1969) support the 
view that the M&A waves have been shaped by the economic turbulence that was 
affecting the market. In 1983, Jensen and Ruback (1983) enunciate that the agreement 
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between companies comes when the value of the new company is bigger than the 
aggregation from both parts. The research of Jensen and Ruback (2002) presents some 
of the major evidence in the field of mergers and acquisitions, and it concludes that 
acquisition earned zero or negative returns counter to the targets that earned significant 
positive returns. 
2.1 Target firms 
 Most of the conducted researches - focused on the returns - show positive abnormal re-
turns for the target firms on the day of the announcement. Specifically, Dodd and Ruback 
(1977) found that the investors with stocks from target firms earn statistically significant 
positive abnormal returns in the first month after the announcement. For successful merger 
proposals, the average abnormal returns were 20.58%, while for the unsuccessful deals 
were 18.96%. Using the Market Model, Dodd analyzed 151 deals during 1970 and 1977 
and the researcher reported large positive abnormal returns accruing target firms share-
holders the previous day and the day of the announcement. Karamanos (2015), who exam-
ined Greek bank M&As from 1996 to 2013, affirms insignificant abnormal returns for the 
shareholders of acquiring firms and 7,44% positive abnormal returns for target firm’s 
shareholders. 
 
2.2 Acquiring firms 
 
While there is an agreement in the sector that target firm shareholders earn statistically 
positive abnormal returns during the period of the announcement, the returns of 
shareholders of acquiring firms remain controversial. Asquith (1983) have shown that 
the acquiring companies present negative abnormal returns not only at the day 0 but  for 
a big period after this as well. Agrawal et al. (1992) concludes that the shareholders 
from the bidding companies face loss up to 10% for the following five years after the 
bid.  
Nevertheless, many studies have shown that there are also some other factors that affect 
the abnormal returns of the involved companies. Some of them are reported below: 
 Method of payment: Deals which the bidders pay with stocks seem to 
end up to negative abnormal returns counter to the deals that reimbursed with 
cash outcome to positive abnormal returns. 
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 Company’s status: Researches as Fuller et al.(2002) show that the bids 
with public firms as target companies give to the bidders zero or negative 
abnormal returns, while on the other hand deals with private companies 
compensate the bidding companies with positive abnormal returns. 
 Relative to the industry: Another study done by Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) shows that the M&A announcements with the aim of differentiation, are 
positively addressed from the market and as a result they harvest to positive 
abnormal returns. 
 High Sigma: Moeller et al. (2007) show that the high sigma has had as a 
result lower abnormal returns to the bidder counter to the study of Officer et al. 
(2008) which shows that the bidders have higher abnormal returns. 
 Cross border M&A: The research of  Doukas and Tavlos (2001) explains 
the fact that the cross-border M&A announcements has led to positive abnormal 
returns, as a result of the diversification of risk. 
 Competition: The competition to obtain the company reduces the 
abnormal returns for the bidding companies, as the target company’s acquisition 
price rises. 
 Friendly or Hostile takeover: Servaes (1991) confirms that the hostile 
bids are connected with lower abnormal returns for the acquiring companies 
while for the targets the effect is positive since the premium higher in hostile 
takeovers. 
 Crossborder M&A: The research of  Doukas and Tavlos (2001) explains 
the fact that the cross-border M&A announcements has led to positive abnormal 
returns, as a result of the diversification of risk. 
 Competition: The competition to acquire the company reduces the 
abnormal returns for the acquiring companies, as the target company’s 
acquisition price rises. 
 Friendly or Hostile takeover: Servaes (1991) confirms that the hostile 
bids are connected with lower abnormal returns for the bidding companies while 
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for the targets the effect is positive since the premium is higher in hostile 
takeovers. 
 
2.3 Stock reaction on M&A announcements. 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions are complicated facts and that’s why they are not able to 
always produce positive value, given that the accomplishment of a new agreement is 
based on a major of variables that are mentioned above. On this point, it is important to 
say that a key role constitutes the incentives of a merger. If the incentives are aimed at 
creating cooperation and acting rationally, this may have an impact on the share prices 
of the merged companies.  
Asquith et al. (1983) examine in their study the effects of both the payment method and 
the restructuring of the capital structure on the common stock returns of bidding 
companies at the first announcement of takeover bids. The evidence suggests that cash 
offers consistently generate higher abnormal returns than stock exchanges. The market’s 
perception of changes in the firms’ capital structure cannot react on both cash offers and 
stock exchanges abnormal returns. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2001) introduce a new model of mergers and acquisitions based on 
stock market misevaluations of the two merging firms. This model analyze who bids 
whom, the methods of payment and the valuation consistencies of transactions. The 
study is supported with available empirical evidence on the returns of merging 
companies and also provides new predictions. 
One further research by Moeller et al. (2005) has shown that for every dollar spent on 
M&As the shareholders of the bidding company lost 12 cents  for a total loss of 240 
billion dollars from 1998 through 2001, while they had  only lost 7 billion in all of the 
1980s, or 1,6 cents per dollar spent. The announcement losses to bidding firm 
shareholders in the 1980s were more than offset by profits to acquired firm shareholders, 
the losses of bidders overdraw the earnings of targets from 1988 through 2001 by 134 
billion dollars. The total loss of bidding shareholders in dollars in 1998 - 2001 is so 
large that their assets would have been increased due to a low number of M&A deals. 
The high losses are in agreement with the existence of negative synergies from the 
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acquisitions. Firms that announce transactions with large dollar costs perform poorly 
afterwards. 
In addition, Mara et al. (2005) examine the abnormal returns of acquirers of listed and 
unlisted target firms in 17 Western European countries over the period 1996-2001. 
Acquirers of unlisted targets earn a significant average abnormal return of 1.48%, while 
listed targets perform an insignificant average abnormal return of -0.38%.This listing 
effect bidders ' returns carry on through event time and across borders and insists after 
controlling from the target's payment method, the size of the acquirer firm, prior 
disclosure of information about the deal, whether the take-over is a cross-border deal 
and other variables.  
 
A further study by Draper and Paudyal (2006) has reported that the transactions with 
privately held firms represent more than 80% of all deals. Despite their importance, 
studies of such deals and their effect on the stock value are rare. Using a very large, 
almost exhaustive sample of UK listed and privately held targets we examine the effect 
of such bids on the risk adjusted return of listed UK bidders over the period 1981 to 
2001. Acquirers generate significantly positive returns over the period around the 
announcement of the deal, although the profits depend on the target's status, the way of 
payment and the relative size of participants. The much quoted conclusion that emerges 
from the experiences of listed acquisition firms that the shareholders of bidding firms 
fail to gain from takeovers, cannot be generalized. Obtaining a privately held firm is an 
attractive option to maximize shareholders profits.  
Existing research shows that much more acquisitions take place when stock markets are 
booming than when markets are depressed (Bouwman et.al 2007). Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) assume that firm-specific and market-wide valuations lead to an 
excess of mergers and these will destroy value. This paper examines whether 
acquisitions occurring during booming markets are fundamentally different from those 
in depressed markets. We find that acquirers buying during high-valuation markets 
achieve significantly higher announcement returns but lower long-run abnormal stock 
and operating performance than those buying during low-valuation markets. We 
investigate possible explanations for the long underperformance period and conclude 
that they are in line with the company’s policy. 
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2.4 Bank industry stock reaction on M&A announcements. 
 
Some researchers have analyzed the abnormal returns of the "bidding" and "target" 
banks separately while others have analyzed the whole amendment in shareholder 
wealth. According to Jensen and Ruback (1983) M&A produce wealth but the main 
beneficiaries are the shareholders of  the  target  corporations. 
 More recent researchers have shown different results to the previous studies. Whether 
we take into account the bidder and the target shareholders of the merging banks earn 
this operation, the creation of global wealth is however tempered by academic research. 
Zhang (1995) show an increase in total worth. Hugues(1999) found that the recent 
consolidation was accompanied by an increase in the equity market performance of 
securities new banking entities, including cross-border bank mergers due to a substantial 
gain in geographic  diversification.  The empirical results in Europe especially Cybo-
Ottone and Murgia (2000) exhibit those abnormal returns, although negative for the 
bidder, stay positive for the target.  Tourani -Rad and Van Beek (1999) found that 
shareholders of targets attain more positive abnormal returns than acquirers. They argue 
that the larger the target bank, the upper the returns are. 
 Lepetit (2004) examine banking M&A during the period 1991-2001 in 13 European 
countries, examine the market reaction to the announcement of the merger. They found 
that the returns of merged banks have react positively in M&A deals. Diaz (2004) using 
panel data over the period 1993 to 2004 on a sample of 1,629 banks, 181 acquisitions 
had been identified. They found that 6 acquisitions of financial  institutions  by  
European  banks  can  improve  their profitability. 
Mergers and acquisitions raise several queries and uncertainties concerning their impact 
in terms of value creation and the findings recorded after mergers are very mixed. It 
therefore seems legitimate to engage in investigation of European banking M&A 
announcements on shareholder wealth. 
 
Due to the outspread of globalization, firms broad their business to many countries. One 
way, this fact can help companies easily get into new markets, is attractive into M&A 
agreements with local companies since it may diminish obstacles to entry into foreign 
markets. This kind of M&A is called cross-border M&As. In theory, cross-border M&A 
deals are supposed to produce wealth for shareholders’ acquirers since they can feign 
 The impact of mergers and acquisitions on shareholders' val-
ue: An empirical analysis of European banks. 
 
22 Emily Charisi 
 
upon the target companies’ resources to take advantage of market imperfection (as 
mentioned by Buckley and Casson, 1976 and Morck and Yeung, 1992). According to 
Morck and Yeung (1991, 1992), Kang (1993), Markides and Ittner (1994); cross-border 
M&As will provide benefits of internalization, synergy and risk interparent. Therefore, 
they are expected to create value for shareholders of both acquirers and target firms. On 
the contrary, from the perspective of acquirers, they normally do not fully understand 
about the target country and target companies. This would potentially lead to 
unsuccessful M&A transactions and wrong valuation of target companies, especially in 
case that those target companies have high level of unsubstantial capital. 
 
 Therefore, due to information asymmetry, acquirers defray higher bid premiums and 
acquisition costs, which will then benefit those target firms in short run and achieve 
negative or zero wealth effect for shareholders of acquirers (Datta and Puia, 1995 and 
Reuer, 2004). In addition, cross-border acquirers may confront more challenges than 
domestic ones such as differentiation in political and legal systems, language obstacles 
and history. These differences may hinder the performance of cross-border firms and 
decrease their stock value. Historically, according to Black (2000), M&As have 
prospered in a low inflation environment. Uddin and Boateng (2011) support the 
opinion that if the inflation rate in the bidder country is very high, then bidders would 
try to bid for acquisition of companies outside their home countries where the inflation 
rate is low. 
 Other adverse effects of inflation include value degradation of capital, misallocation of 
resources, and decadence of markets. In cross border deals, exchange rate fluctuations 
may also affects the relative strength of the bidders‘ home currency with respect to that 
of the targets‘ which will affect to the premium paid for the transaction. Several studies 
(Harris and Ravenscraft 1991, Kiymaz and Mukherjee 2000) have conclude that, when 
the bidder country‘s currency is strong, the target shareholders gain by earning higher 
returns.  Kiymaz (2004) advise that bidders will gain from a strong home currency 
during the transaction and from a weak home currency at the time of distributing 
dividends and cash flows. In general, inflation and exchange rates are more likely to 
affect expected cash flows from crossborder mergers, and acquirers shareholder return 
may also be affected indirectly though the effect of inflation and relative strength of 
currently in the acquirer and target countries on the value of dealings. 
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2.4.2 Impact of direction of M&As on stock performance. 
 
 If the bidder and target firms operate in a similar line of business, this M&A deal is 
classified as horizontal M&A. In a horizontal M&A, positive abnormal returns are 
generally acknowledged due to the possibilities for synergy. The expected value results 
from improvement of management and operation (Eriksson and Hogfeldt, 1998). 
Besides that, market theory states that horizontal M&A can help combined companies 
save costs and enter into new market to make use of overcapacity and to reduce 
competition (De Jong, 1998). 
 Vertical M&A is the combination of two firms at different stages of production 
(Brealey, 2008).The acquirer will acquire backwards in its source of raw materials or 
forward in the direction of final consumer. With vertical M&As, firms are able to 
minimize costs through backward merger, and earn higher margins through forward 
merger. However, in consistent with Morck (1990), synergy effects are hardly realized 
due to their lack economies of scale and integration problems. Therefore, shareholders 
of vertical M&As are expected to experience negative abnormal returns. 
 Conglomerate M&As are transactions in which two firms are combined in unrelated 
lines of businesses (Brealey, 2008). The motive behind this kind of M&As is 
diversification. Managers want to spread the risks by being active in different markets. It 
is expected that this type of M&As will generate negative stock reactions, as acquirers' 
shareholders can spread their risks without incurring costs arising out of M&A’s. 
Therefore, empirical evidence suggests that transactions in conglomerate M&As provide 
the lowest return to shareholders as no synergies are realized (Morck ,1990). Berger and 
Ofek (1995) found that the average loss in value from diversification M&As is around 
13-15%. Some empirical studies have shown that the degree of industry relatedness 
between bidder and target firms correlates positively with returns. Bosveld et al. (1997) 
examine Dutch M&A transactions between 1979 and 1995. They have found that both 
acquirer and target companies show positive CAR in horizontal M&A transactions. 
Maquieira et al.(1998) report insignificant negative returns to shareholders in 
conglomerate M&As, while a significant positive abnormal returns in non-conglomerate 
M&As. 
 Shareholders of acquirers will normally receive positive abnormal returns as a 
consequence of M&A announcements if the target fims are in a similar industry to 
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acquirer; while they receive negative or insignificant abnormal returns when the M&A 
transactions are vertical or conglomerate. 
 
2.4.3 Impact of means of payment on stock performance 
 
  Acquiring firms commonly use three payment methods for the target firms. They are 
able to pay target companies in cash or by shares or a combination of them. In a cash 
financed transaction, the acquirer will offer and acquire shares of target companies and 
in return will pay them in cash. In share swap, the acquirers will obtain the shares from 
shareholders of the target firms and in return offer them their own shares. These 
methods may react on the performance of merged firms. Myers and Majluf (1984), 
Fishman (1989) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2000), based on asymmetric information, 
suggest that the bidder will pay the target firms in shares if they throw their shares are 
overvalued or there is high uncertainty on the target’s value. In contrast, they may use 
cash to buy target firms if they believe their stocks are undervalued or there is high 
uncertainty on the acquirer’s own value. 
Huang and Walking (1985) expose reasons for preferring cash offers. First, using stock 
offer can contribute to dilution of reported earnings and welfare of shareholders. 
Second, in real market, cash offer waits for several months to get approval from 
Securities and Exchange Commission. Hence, it will impede the progress of M&A 
transactions and increase the uncertainty of the stock market. However, given acquirers 
have limited cash and liquid assets, cash offer can ordinarily need debt funding. Debt 
funding, therefore, create monetary distress for the corporations and may limit cash 
flows for alternative future investments. As a result, it will have an effect on the 
shareholders’ value. In that sense, cash offer is only appropriate for small M&A 
transactions or those companies, which have abundant cash. Moreover, according to 
Rappaport and Sirower (1999), offering cash as a mean of payment, acquiring 
shareholders are taking entire risk that expected synergy value will not materialize. 
Meanwhile, with deals financed by stocks, this risk is shared with selling shareholders 
consistent with the percentage of merged firm those acquiring and selling shareholders 
own. 
  Wansley et al. (1983) searches for distinction in returns of target firms using cash or 
stocks to finance M&As transactions. They have report that those target firms using cash 
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finance would gain, on average, 33.54% abnormal returns around M&A announcements. 
Meanwhile, target firms using stock finance receives only 17.47% abnormal returns. 
Similarly, Huang and Walking (1987) in their research, documented that an average 
abnormal return of 29.3% is realized for target firms in M&A deals using cash finance, 
while only 14.4% abnormal return is recorded for M&A transactions using stock 
finance. Moreover, they notice that M&A transactions using mixed payment can bring 
about 23.3% abnormal returns for shareholders of target firms. Consequently, target 
firms seem to be more beneficial in M&As financed by cash than those financed by 
stocks or mixed offers. 
 Most of empirical studies conclude that acquirers using cash will produce higher returns 
than those using stock offer. Travlos (1987) documented a significant difference 
between cash and stock M&As while investigating 60 acquirers. Acquirers using stock 
offer experience significant negative cumulative abnormal return of -1.47%, while 
acquirers using cash offer earn an insignificant positive of 0.24% cumulative abnormal 
return. Likewise, Brown and Ryngaert (1991) achieved the same result once examining 
268 M&A deals. They found  insignificant positive abnormal return of 0.06% to M&A 
transactions with cash offers, while a significant negative abnormal return of -2.74% 
with stock offers. The mixed offer between cash and stock generates a significant 
positive abnormal return of 2.48%. Wansley (1983) studied 203 companies listed in the 
Federal Trade Commission large merger series in the period from 1970 to 1978. They 
found that cumulative average abnormal return generated for acquirers of cash deals are 
11% higher than that of stock deals. The study of Huang and Walking (1985) conjointly 
supports the current finding. 
 Despite several studies indicate the underperformance of stock offer in reference to 
cash offer, the number of M&A transactions using stock offer has been increased and 
significantly become more popular since 1990’s. It raises concerns that current 
hypothesis is not any longer valid. Indeed, Chang (1998) examines returns of acquirers 
around the day 0 of an acquisition proposal when target firms are privately held. He 
concludes that there were no abnormal returns for acquirers using cash finance, but 
positive abnormal returns for bidders using stock offer. They concluded that there is no 
significant difference for shareholders of firms financing the deals by cash or shares. 
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3. Methodology and Data 
 
In this unit, are presented both the methodology and data of the sample that was used in 
the empirical research in order to end up in inference, regarding the reaction of the stock 
prices for banks and financial institutes (both bidders and targets) after the Merger or 
Acquisition announcement, in the time period 2007-2016. 
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3.1 Methodology 
 The most of the researches that have taken place in the sector of M&A use the Event 
Studies Methodology (Brown,1968) with which is being considered if the 
announcement of a financial event affects the stock value of a firm. We will use the 
same methodology in short-term analysis to investigate the incidence of the M&A in the 
stock prices from the date of announcement until its completion, supposing  that the 
market is efficient, namely the stock price integrates all the information regarding to the 
fact and the investors has direct access to them. 
 The time interval from the deal announcement until its integration is known as 
observation period and in this specific research is the period of (-260,-20) days before 
the event date (noted as day 0). The observation period could be divided into event 
windows which usually are sub-areas before and after the announcement date. 
   We have determined the event windows of this study as the following time periods: (-
20, +20), (-10, +10) and (-2, +2) days.  After the definition of the observation period and 
the event windows we have to calculate the Normal Return (Rt) for the stock prices for 
the time period (-260,-20) days, which reflects the output that will the stocks have, if the 
financial event did not exist. The discrepancy between the Expected returns (ERt) and 
the Observed returns (Rt) is known as Abnormal Return (ARt) and represents the 
financial value that was created from the M&A announcement. 
3.1.1 Market Model 
Beneficial to typify a return as abnormal we will be using the Market Model. Market 
Model also called single-index model states that return generated by a security is 
dependent on that generated by the market portfolio and the degree to which the security 
responds as evaluated by beta. Also, the return depends on some conditions unique to 
the business. Market Model correlates the stock returns for every company with the 
benchmark portfolio returns, which usually is the Market Index 
(eventstudymetrics,2010). 
The observed returns: 
 R(i,t)= ai +bi Rmt +e(i,t) 
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Where: 
 i=1,…….,N 
t=1,……..,M 
R(i,t) = the observed return of firm i at time t. 
Rmt= market returns at time t 
ai = firm’s i intercept term of the regression 
bi = firm’s i regression coefficient 
e(i,t) = the residual error 
As benchmark portfolio we will use the stock exchange of the country in which the firm 
is traded, as they depicted the markets efficiently and they fulfill the requirements to be 
a reliable measure of our portfolio’s comparison with the market. 
The expected return will calculate for the observation period (-260,-20) days with the 
following model: 
ER(i,t)= ai +bi Rmt 
Where: 
 i=1,…….,N 
t=1,……..,M 
ER(i,t) = the expected return of firm i at time t. 
Rmt= market returns at time t 
ai = firm’s i intercept term of the regression 
bi = firm’s i regression coefficient 
While, the ai and bi are the assessments that have been emerged from the Market Model, 
which is detailed above. 
The abnormal returns arising from the following type: 
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ARit = Rit - ER(it) 
Where: 
 i=1,…….,N 
t=1,……..,M 
Rit = the observed return of firm i at time t. 
ER(it)  = the expected return of firm i at time t. 
Providing that, the Abnormal Returns are positive (AR>0) can be said that M&A creates 
value, otherwise when the Abnormal Returns are negative (AR<0) M&A reduce the 
firm’s value. Additionally, if the Abnormal Returns are equal to zero (AR=0) no change 
is observed in the firm’s value, as a result of the M&A deal. 
Furthermore, the Average Abnormal Returns (AARt) and the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAARt) have to be calculated both for bidders and targets stock into the 
observation period. The Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAARt ) represent the overall 
average impact of the deals for every firm in a specific period. 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARt) = (∑i ARit ) / N 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAARt) = ∑ 
n
t=0 AARt 
Where: 
 i=1,…….,N 
t=1,……..,M 
ARit   = the abnormal return of stock j at time t. 
AARt   = the average abnormal return of all companies at time t. 
3.1.2 Significance Tests 
 
Regarding to the significance tests, Cross-Sectional test will be using to verify the 
results. 
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We have two basic hypotheses: 
• The null hypothesis (Ho) that is differentiated from the sample results. 
• The alternative hypothesis (H1) that confirms the sample results. 
Specifically, in this research : 
• Under the null hypothesis (Ho), the cumulative average abnormal return is equal 
to zero and as a result the investors do not benefit from the M&A deals. 
• Under the alternative hypothesis (H1), the cumulative average returns are 
different from zero and the investors are not affected from the M&A deals. 
Taking into account that X and S2 are the mean and the variance of a random sample, 
then the statistic of the test which used is the random variable t which follows the 
normal distribution with ν = n-1 degrees of freedom (n is the population of the sample). 
The variance estimator of this statistic is based on the cross-section of abnormal returns. 
• A simple test for testing 
Ho: AAR =0 is given by 
t AARt = √N  (AARt  / SAARt ) 
where: 
S2AARt = (1/N-1) ∑
N
i=1 (ARit –AARt)
2
 
• A simple test for testing 
Ho: CAAR =0 is given by 
t CAARt = √N  (CAARt  / SCAARt ) 
where: 
S2 CAARt = (1/N-1) ∑
N
i=1 (CARit –CAARt)
2
 
N = is the number of the days of the estimation window 
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If t-stat is bigger or equal to a critical value (accordingly to the level of significance) the 
null hypothesis Ho will be rejected and as a result AARs and CAARs will be statistically 
significant. 
Brown and Warner (1980) show that the cross-sectional t-test is robust to an event –
induced variance increase. However, Boehmer ,Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) provide 
evidence that their standardized cross-sectional test (requiring an estimation window) 
exhibits a comparable size, but it is more powerful (Eventstudymetrics,2015). 
3.2 Objective 
 
To address the above issues, the following findings have been identified. 
To measure the impact of the announcement of M&As on stock value of bidding 
companies by: 
• Ascertaining the magnitude and the direction of the ARs for the entire sample. 
• Conducting analysis of the ARs for subsamples on the basis of: 
(a) General Sample of M&A bank deals (acquirers and targets) 
(b) Domestic and cross-border M&A bank deals 
(c) Method of payment (cash, stock or combination) 
 
3.3 Data selection 
The study is confined to the analysis of bidding and target banks that undertook the 
move of M&A and are listed. It covers a period starting from 1 January 2007 to 31 
December 2016. There were 114 M&A deals during this period related to banks and 
financial institutions. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:Year-wise Distribution of M&A Announcements (2007-2016) 
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M&A/Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total M&A deals 37 27 9 10 3 11 6 7 2 2 
Percentage (%) 32.45 23.68 7.89 8.77 2.63 9.64 5.26 6.14 1.75 1.75 
 
Table 1 provides the year-wise sample distribution of M&A. It has been observed that 
the maximum announcements happened in the year 2007 (32.45%) followed by 2008 
(23.68%) and 2011 (2.63%). Table 1 also reveals that the number of M&A deals has 
been decreased since year 2007, probably as a result of the global financial crisis. 
 
 Table 2:Year-wise Sample Distribution of Cross-border and Domestic M&A (2007-2016) 
Year Cross-border M&A Domestic M&A Total 
2007 7 30 37 
2008 15 12 27 
2009 3 6 9 
2010 7 3 10 
2011 2 1 3 
2012 8 3 11 
2013 5 1 6 
2014 3 4 7 
2015 0 2 0 
2016 1 1 2 
Total 51 63 114 
 
 
Table 2 depicts that the trend of cross-border and domestic M&A has been decreasing 
since year 2007 over the sample period with the lowest number of M&A reported in 
years 2015 and 2016 for both of the categories. 
 
 
 Table 3:Sample Distribution of Cross-border and Domestic M&A According to Features. 
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Feature Cross-border 
M&A 
Domestic M&A Total 
M&A 
Cash financed M&A 23 47 70 
Stock financed M&A 4 24 28 
Cash and debt financed M&A 1 1 2 
Stock and debt financed M&A 0 1 1 
M&A with mixed financing 3 1 4 
Undisclosed 5 3 8 
 
Table 3 indicates that cash is the most frequently used form of financing in both the sets 
of M&A. Contrary to the domestic acquisitions, for cross-border M&A, stock payments 
are rarely used. 
 
   Table 4: Stake-wise Distribution of M&A Announcements (2007-2016) 
Acquisition of/Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total Percentage 
Minor stake 12 11 7 5 1 3 1 3 0 1 44 38.60% 
Major/partial 
stake 
11 8 2 2 0 3 2 1 0 0 29 25.44% 
Complete stake 14 8 0 3 2 5 3 3 2 1 41 35.96% 
 
Table 4 summarizes the stake-wise sample distribution of M&A. It is evident from the 
Table that the most (38.60%) of the transactions are of minor stake, whereas nearly 
(35.96 %) are the deals of complete stake, and acquisitions are of partial/majority  
control represent the lowest rate. 
 
 
 
4.Empirical Results 
 
In the following section we will present the findings of this research which are related to 
M&A announcement, using the Market Model .These results will be presented in two 
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forms: graphic trace and tables of the average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative  
average  abnormal  returns  (CAAR)  on  three different event windows. The average 
abnormal returns are designed to examine the effect of the announcement of M&A deals 
for a given event date, the 0 of the announcement . The average cumulative abnormal 
returns during the event window allows, as it has globally measure the effect of the 
event on the whole event window. The size of the impact analysis period is 41 days (-
20,+20) ,22 days (-10,+10) and 5 days (-2,+2) that identifies the expectations and 
possible corrections in the stock market for an estimation window of 260 days.  
In the following pages we will present the reaction of the stock performance as a result 
of the transaction. We will analyze the performance of target and acquiring banks. 
Moreover, we are going to investigate the subcategories of domestic and crossborder 
M&As and how the way of payment affects the stock price of both firms as well.   
 
4.1 Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of 
Acquirers 
4.1.1 General Sample 
4.1.1.1. Event window of 41 days (-20,+20) 
 
 Table 5: CAAR of Acquirers (-20,+20) 
Time Interval  CAAR(%)  t-value  
Pre- Announcement period (-20,-2) 0,34% 0,50 
Announcement period (-1,0) 0,06% 0,90 
Post-Announcement period (1,20) -2,00% -0,12 
 
As tables 5 depicts, the average abnormal returns of acquirers are divided into three 
phases. The first phase is the period before the deal announcement, from day -20 to day -2, 
the abnormal returns seem to be positive. It goes up to 0,44% from day -19 to day -16, and 
then drops to 0,10% at day -5. After that, it starts to drop aggressively to -0,79% at the day 
the announcement is taken place (t=0). It indicates that the shareholders gain negative 
abnormal returns in the announcement day. Nevertheless, abnormal return recovers again 
and achieves 0,39% abnormal return for shareholders in 1 day 1 after announcement day. 
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After day t=1, the average abnormal return drops again dramatically and shows negative 
returns to shareholders in the last phase from day +3 till the last day of the event window 
(t=+20).It is important to mention that the negative abnormal returns are not statistically 
significant as the positive abnormal returns in the pre-announcement period. 
In order to examine the total effect of M&A announcement, we will examine the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) in different time intervals. The cumulative 
average abnormal returns are examined in 3 time intervals: pre-announcement period (-
20,-2), announcement period (-1,0) and post-announcement period (+1,+20). Table 6 
describes CAAR of acquirers during three periods. According to table 6, CAARs under the 
first two time periods are positive and only the last one seems to be negative.   
Shareholders of acquirers earn a positive CAAR of 0,34% during pre-announcement 
period. The positive return can be explained as investors are expected about the future 
performance of combined firms. 
The abnormal returns are realized in the announcement period. From a day prior to 
announcement day, shareholders of acquirers receive a positive CAAR of 0,13%. The 
CAAR for shareholders of acquirers in the post-announcement period is -2,00%. 
This result is consistent most previous studies, indicating that CAAR will generate 
negative abnormal returns to shareholders of acquirers or they will not generate any of 
them. We can see that CAAR obtained from post-announcement period is lower than pre- 
and announcement period. This shows that investors may overestimate the acquirers 
during pre- and announcement period. Hence, when more information such as financial 
information of related companies or terms and conditions of the proposal are available. 
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Figure 1: AAR and CAAR of Acquirers (-20,+20) 
 
As we can see in Figure 1 the AARs for the Acquiring firms present a small variation, as 
they perform returns from -1,03% until 0,60% for the event window of 41 days. In contrast 
with AARs, CAARs have a bigger variation in their stock value especially after day 4 with 
prices from -3,48 until 0,99 per cent. 
 
4.1.1.2 Event window of 21 days (-10,+10) 
 
Table 6: CAAR of Acquirers (-10,+10) 
Time Interval  CAAR (%) t-value 
Pre-announcement period (-10,-2) -1,95% -0,61 
Announcement period (-2,1) -1,71% -0,80 
Post-announcement period (1,10) -2,73% -1,52 
 
We will examine the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) in different time 
intervals also for this event window. The examined in 3 time phases are the following for 
the 21 days of the event window: pre-announcement period (-10,-2), announcement period 
(-1,0) and post-announcement period (+1,+10). Table 8 describes CAAR of acquirers 
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during three periods. According to table 8, CAARs under the three periods seem to be 
negative . 
Shareholders of acquirers get  negative CAAR of -1,95% during pre-announcement period. 
The abnormal returns are remaining negative also in the announcement period and the 
post-announcement period (-1,71% and 2,73% respectively). 
This result in agreement with most of previous studies, indicating that CAAR will generate 
negative abnormal returns to shareholders of acquirers or they will not generate any of 
them. We can see that CAAR obtained from post-announcement period is lower than pre- 
and announcement period. This shows that investors may overestimate the acquirers 
during pre- and announcement period. 
 
Figure 2: AAR and CAAR of Acquirers (-10,+10) 
 
As we can see in Figure 2 the AARs for the Acquiring firms present a small variation, as 
they perform returns from -0,20% until -0,82% for the event window of 21 days. In 
contrast with AARs, CAARs have a bigger variation in their stock value with prices from -
5,62 until 1,30 per cent. 
 
 
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
-6,00% 
-5,00% 
-4,00% 
-3,00% 
-2,00% 
-1,00% 
0,00% 
1,00% 
2,00% 
Acquiring Banks Returns for the Event Window of 21 days 
AAR CAAR 
 The impact of mergers and acquisitions on shareholders' val-
ue: An empirical analysis of European banks. 
 
38 Emily Charisi 
 
4.1.1.3 Event window of 5 days (-2,+2) 
 
Table 7: CAAR of Acquirers (-2,+2) 
Time Interval  CAAR (%) t-value 
Pre-announcement period (-2) -0,50% -0,12 
Announcement period (-1,0) -0,86% -0,445 
Post-announcement period (1,2) -1,73% -0,63 
 
We are going to divide the average abnormal returns of acquirers into three time phases. In 
the first one, the pre-announcement phase which is the day -2, the abnormal returns seem 
to be negative (-0,22%). It goes up to 0,12% the next day (day -1) , and then drops to 
0,92% at the announcement day . It indicates that the shareholders gain negative abnormal 
returns in the announcement day also for this event window. After that, it starts to recovers 
again one day after the announcement to 0,29%. After day t=1, the average abnormal 
return drops again and shows negative returns to shareholders. It is important to mention 
that the negative abnormal returns are not statistically significant. 
 
Figure 3: AAR and CAAR of Acquirers (-2,+2) 
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As present in Figure 3 AARs for the Acquiring firms give a small variation, as they 
perform returns from -0,92% (at the announcement day) until 0,29% for the event window 
of 5 days. In contrast with AARs, CAARs have a bigger variation in their stock value but 
they earn only negative abnormal returns among this specific event window with prices 
from -2,04% until 0,25%. 
4.2.1 Domestic and Cross-border transactions and their impact to acquirer’s 
shareholders 
4.2.1.1 Event window of 41 days (-20,+20) 
We split our sample into two groups: cross-border and domestic M&As. Cross-border 
M&A group includes all transactions in which acquirers obtain target companies in other 
countries. Domestic M&A group includes all transactions in which both acquirer and target 
companies are operating in the same country. Our sample includes 51 cross-border and 63 
domestic M&A transactions. Table 8,9 and 10 show CAAR that shareholders of acquirers 
earn before, during and after M&A announcements, distributed by whether the transactions 
are cross-border or domestic M&A. 
 
   Table 8: Domestic and Cross-border CAAR of Acquirers (-20,+20) 
Time Interval  
CAAR(%) 
Cash 
CAAR(%) 
Other 
t-value 
Cash 
t-value 
Other 
Pre-Announcement period 
(-20,-2) 0,44% 0,92% 0,48 0,01 
Announcement period (-1,0) -0,59% 1,91% 0,05 0,02 
Post-Announcement period 
(1,20) -3,97% 1,67% -1,73 0,02 
 
According to Table 8, during three time intervals, both domestic and cross-border M&A 
transactions generally generate positive CAAR. During pre-announcement period, both 
cross-border and domestic M&As generate CAARs of 0,92% and 0,44% respectively. 
Nevertheless, they are not statistically significant different from zero. In the announcement 
period, shareholders of acquirers earn 1,91% CAAR in cross-border M&As and receive -
0,59% CAAR if the target companies are inside the acquirers’ country. Nevertheless, they 
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are not significantly different from zero. Therefore, we can conclude that the country of 
target companies impose effects on the value of acquirers’ shareholders during the 
announcement period. 
Moreover, cross-border M&A deals seem to generate higher abnormal returns than 
domestic M&A transactions during pre- and announcement period. Domestic M&A 
transactions are not being seen as attractive to shareholders of acquirers during these two 
periods 
During post-announcement period, domestic M&A transactions slightly generate higher 
CAAR than cross-border M&A ones. Shareholders of acquirers in domestic M&A 
transactions earn about 3,97% CAAR, while those in crossborder M&A transactions get 
1,67% CAAR. However, any of them generate significant CAARs0,59% CAAR if the 
target companies are inside the acquirers’ country. Nevertheless, they are not significantly 
different from zero. Therefore, we can conclude that the country of target companies 
impose effects on the value of acquirers’ shareholders during the announcement period.  
 
Figure 4: Domestic and Cross-border CAAR of Acquirers (-20,+20) 
 
As we can see in Figure 4, the CAARs of cross-border transactions present a small 
variation, as they perform returns from -0,28 % until 2,50% for the event window of 41 
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days. In contrast with cross-border CAARs, domestic CAARs have a bigger variation in 
their stock value among the same period with prices from -5,06 until 1,56 per cent. 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Event window of 21 days (-10,+10) 
 
   Table 9: Domestic and Cross-border CAAR of Acquirers (-10,+10) 
Time Interval  
CAAR(%) Cross-
border 
CAAR(%) 
Domestic 
t-value Cross-
border 
t-value 
Domestic 
Pre- Announcement period 
(-10,-2) -1,22% -0,41% 0,25 -0,37 
Announcement period (-
1,0) 1,68% -0,96% 0,25 -0,92 
Post-Announcement period 
(1,10) 2,04% -3,51% -0,08 -2,31 
 
During pre-announcement period, both cross-border and domestic M&As generate CAARs 
of -1,22% and -0,41% respectively. Nevertheless, they are not statistically significant 
different from zero. In the announcement period, shareholders of acquirers earn 1,68% 
CAAR in cross-border M&As and receive -0,96% CAAR if the target companies are 
inside the acquirers’ country. Nevertheless, they are not significantly different from zero. 
Moreover, cross-border M&A deals seem to generate higher abnormal returns than 
domestic M&A transactions during announcement period. Domestic M&A transactions are 
not being seen as attractive to shareholders of acquirers during this period. 
During post-announcement period, domestic M&A transactions keep generating lower 
CAAR than cross-border M&A ones. Shareholders of acquirers in domestic M&A 
transactions lose about -3,51% CAAR, while those in cross-border M&A transactions earn 
2,04% CAAR. However, only CAARs of domestic deals are statistically significant. This 
result is in contrast with our previous result for the event window of 41 days. 
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Figure 5: Domestic and Cross-border CAAR of Acquirers (-10,+10) 
 
As we can see in Figure 5 the CAARs of cross-border transactions present a big variation, 
as they perform returns from -3,62 % until 3,19% for the event window of 21 days. Also, 
domestic CAARs have a bigger variation in their stock value among the same period with 
prices from -7,04 until 0,37 per cent. 
4.2.3.1 Event window of 5 days (-2,+2) 
 
Table 10: Domestic and Cross-border CAAR of Acquirers (-2,+2) 
Time Interval  
CAAR(%
) Cross-
border 
CAAR(%) 
Domestic 
t-value 
Cross-
border 
t-value 
Domestic 
Pre-Announcement 
period (-2) 
-0,76% -0,12% -0,76% -0,26 
Announcement period (-
1,0) 
-0,86% -0,66% -0,86% -0,95 
Post-Announcement 
period (1,2) 
-1,55% -1,35% -1,55% -1,38 
 
 
In the pre-announcement period, both cross-border and domestic M&As generate negative 
CAARs of -0,12% and -0,76% respectively. Nevertheless, they are not statistically 
significant different from zero. In the announcement period, shareholders of acquirers earn 
-0,26% CAAR in cross-border M&As and receive -0,01% CAAR if the target companies 
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are inside the acquirers’ country. Nevertheless, they are not significantly different from 
zero. Therefore, we cannot conclude if that the country of target companies impose effects 
on the value of acquirers’ shareholders during the announcement period. 
Moreover, cross-border M&A deals seem to generate higher abnormal returns than 
domestic M&A transactions during announcement period and the post announcement 
period. Shareholders of acquirers in cross-border M&A transactions earn about -0,08 % 
CAAR, while those in domestic M&A transactions get -1,35% CAAR. However, no one of 
them generate significant CAARs in order to reject the null H0 hypothesis. 
 
Figure 6: Domestic and Cross-border CAAR of Acquirers (-2,+2) 
. 
Figure 6 shows the CAARs of cross-border and domestic transactions. Both CAARS 
present a small variation, as they perform returns from -1,55 % until 0,10% (domestic) and 
-0,33% until 0,34% (cross-border) ,for the event window -5,+5 days. 
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4.1.3 Methods of payment and their impact to acquirer’s shareholders 
4.1.3.1 Event window of 41 days (-20,+20) 
Table 11: CAAR of Acquirers and methods of payment (-20,+20) 
Time Interval  
CAAR(%) 
Cash 
CAAR(%) 
Other 
t-value 
Cash 
t-value 
Other 
Pre- Announcement period (-
20,-2) 0,01% 0,63% 0,43 0,65 
Announcement period (-1,0) 
 0,65% -0,74% 1,68 0,05 
Post-Announcement period 
(1,20) -0,06% -4,65% 1,67 -2,36 
 
In Table 11 are analyzed the CAAR of acquirers to the extent of methods of payment 
during three different time periods. We examine the impacts of methods of payment by 
dividing the sample into two groups: cash and others. Cash group includes all M&A 
transactions financed by cash. Other groups contain all M&A transactions financed by 
stock or combination of cash and stocks. Our sample includes 70 transactions, which are 
financed by cash, and 44 transactions, which are financed by other methods of payments. 
Other methods of payment can be stock finance or a combination of cash and stocks, from 
which 28 transactions are financed by stock and the remaining 36 transactions are financed 
by both stocks and cash.   
Method of payment does have impact on CAARs of acquirers. As can be seen from the 
table 10, during pre-and announcement period, all the other methods of payment produce 
positive CAARs for shareholders of acquirers, but deals which are financed by cash seem 
to give neutral results to the stock price. In the pre-announcement period, other methods of 
payment generate 0,63% CAAR for acquirers’ shareholders, which is statistically 
insignificant. In the announcement period, M&A transactions with cash offer create 0.65% 
CAAR for shareholders of acquirers, while other methods of payment generates a negative 
insignificant CAAR of -0,74%. Therefore, methods of payment have no impacts on 
CAARs for shareholders of acquirers during pre-announcement period. 
During this first (pre-announcement) period, we can find that shareholders of M&A 
transactions, which use other methods of payment besides cash only, seem to be more 
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beneficial than those using cash offer. CAARs generated from other methods of payment 
dominate those generated from cash offer. Hence, M&A transactions with cash offer in 
banking sector in the period 2006-2017 do not offer higher abnormal returns to 
shareholders of acquirers as indicated by most of previous studies. 
On the other hand, over the period after M&A announcements are made, the impacts seem 
to be contrary. M&A transactions with cash offer generate a small negative CAAR of -
0,06% for shareholders of acquirers. However, shareholders of acquirers using other 
methods of payment earn a negative CAAR of -4,65%. CAAR from M&A transactions 
with cash offer tends to be higher than those with other offers in the announcement periods 
and the post-announcement period, leading to an opposite result to those obtained for pre- 
announcement. In addition, the CAARs of cash financed deals are insignificant but the 
CAARs which occur from transactions based on other ways of payments are statistically 
significant. Therefore, methods of payment have impact on CAARs for shareholders of 
acquirers during post-announcement period. 
 
Figure 7: CAAR of Acquirers and methods of payment (-20,+20) 
 
As we can see in Figure 7 the CAARs of cash financed transactions present a small 
variation, as they perform returns from -0,90 % until 0,88% for the event window of 41 
days. In contrast with M&A deal’s CAARs which are financed by other ways of payment 
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(or combination of them) and they present a bigger variation in their stock value with 
prices from -7,96 until 1,35 per cent. 
4.1.3.2 Event window of 21 days (-10,+10) 
Table 12: CAAR of Acquirers and methods of payment (-10,+10) 
Time Interval  
CAAR(%) 
other 
CAAR(%) 
cash 
t-value 
other 
t-value 
cash 
Pre- Announcement period 
 (-10,-2) -0,21% -0,67% -0,04 -0,24 
Announcement period (-1,0) 
 -1,76% 0,40% -1,23 0,72 
Post-Announcement period 
(1,10) -3,80% -0,61% -2,70 0,52 
 
In the pre-announcement period, other methods of payment generate -0,21% CAAR for 
acquirers’ shareholders and cash financed transactions give -0,67%, which are statistically 
insignificant. In the announcement period, M&A transactions with cash offer create 0.40% 
CAAR for shareholders of acquirers, while other methods of payment generates a negative 
insignificant CAAR of -1,76%. Therefore, methods of payment have no impacts on 
CAARs for shareholders of acquirers during pre-announcement period. 
During this first (pre-announcement) period, we can find that shareholders of M&A 
transactions, which use other methods of payment besides cash only, seem to be more 
beneficial than those using cash offer. CAARs generated from other methods of payment 
dominate those generated from cash offer. Hence, M&A transactions with cash offer in 
banking sector in the period 2006-2017 do not offer higher abnormal returns to 
shareholders of acquirers as indicated by most of previous studies. 
Furthermore, over the period after M&A announcements are made, the impacts seem to be 
the same. M&A transactions with cash offer generate a small negative CAAR of -0,61% 
for shareholders of acquirers. However, shareholders of acquirers using other methods of 
payment earn a negative CAAR of -3,80%. In addition, the CAARs of cash financed deals 
are insignificant but the CAARs which occur from transactions based on other ways of 
payments are statistically significant. Therefore, methods of payment have impact on 
CAARs for shareholders of acquirers only during post-announcement period. 
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Figure 8: CAAR of Acquirers and methods of payment (-10,+10) 
 
As we can see in Figure 8, CAAR of cash financed transactions present a small variation, 
as they perform returns from -1,71 % until 0,43% for the event window of 21 days. In 
contrast with M&A deal’s CAARs which are financed by other ways of payment (or 
combination of them) and they present a bigger variation in their stock value with prices 
from -7,47 until 0,56 per cent. 
4.1.3.3 Event window of 5 days (-2, +2) 
Table 13: CAAR of Acquirers and methods of payment (-2,+2) 
Time Interval  
CAAR(%) 
other 
CAAR(%) 
cash 
t-value 
other 
t-value 
cash 
Pre- Announcement period 
-0,51% -0,07% -0,39 0,05 
 (-2) 
Announcement period (-1,0) -1,45% 0,00% -1,34 0,13 
Post-Announcement period 
(1,10) 
-2,10% -0,02% -1,74 0,08 
 
As can be seen from the table 13, during pre-and announcement period, all the other meth-
ods of payment produce negative CAARs for shareholders of acquirers, but deals which 
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are financed by cash seem to give neutral results to the stock price. In the pre-
announcement period, other methods of payment generate -0,51% CAAR for acquirers’ 
shareholders, which is statistically insignificant. In the announcement period, M&A trans-
actions with cash offer remains again almost neutral with a small increase of 0,3% CAAR 
for shareholders of acquirers, while other methods of payment generates a negative insig-
nificant CAAR of -1,45%. Therefore, methods of payment have no impacts on CAARs for 
shareholders of acquirers during pre-announcement period and the announcement period 
(days -2,+1). 
During this first period, we can find that shareholders of M&A transactions, which use 
cash as way of payment besides stocks or combination of both, seem to be more effective. 
CAARs generated from cash offers dominate those generated from other methods of 
payment. Hence, M&A transactions with cash offer in banking sector in the period 2006-
2017 offer higher abnormal returns to shareholders of acquirers as indicated by most of 
previous studies. 
On the other hand, over the period after the announcement, the impacts seem to be 
different. M&A transactions with cash offer generate a small negative CAAR of -0,02% 
for shareholders of acquirers. However, shareholders of acquirers using other methods of 
payment get a negative CAAR of -2,10%. CAAR from M&A transactions with cash offer 
tends to be higher than those with other offers in the announcement periods and the post-
announcement period, leading to an opposite result to those obtained for pre-
announcement, as also in the previous event windows.. Therefore, both CAARs of cash 
financed deals and of those which are financed with other ways of payment are 
insignificant in the post-announcement period. Therefore, methods of payment have no 
impact on CAARs for shareholders of acquirers during post-announcement period. 
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Figure 9 : CAAR of Acquirers and methods of payment (-2,+2) 
 
As we can see in Figure 9 the CAARs of cash financed transactions present a small 
variation, as they perform returns only from -0,10 % until 0,06% for the event window of 5 
days. In contrast with M&A deal’s CAARs which are financed by other ways of payment 
(or combination of them) and they perform a big variation in their stock value with prices 
from -2,43 % until -0,48% per cent. 
 
4.2 Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
for Targets 
4.2.1 General Sample 
4.2.1.1 Event window of 41 days (-20,+20) 
 
 Table 13: CAAR of Targets (-20,+20) 
Time Interval  CAAR(%) t-value 
Pre -Announcement (-20,-2) 2,07% 0,26 
Announcement period (-1,0) 4,38% 0,41 
Post-Announcement (+2,+20) 9,54% 0,96 
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We will analyze the cumulative average abnormal return in the same three time intervals 
also for the target banks. The examined in 3 time sectors are the following for the 41 days 
of the event window: pre-announcement period (-20,2), announcement period (-1,0) and 
post-announcement period (+1,+20). Table 8 describes CAAR of targets during three 
periods. According to table 8, CAARs under the three periods seem to be extremely 
positive . 
Shareholders of targets get positive CAAR of 2,07% during pre-announcement period. The 
abnormal returns are getting higher also in the announcement period and the post-
announcement period (4,38% and 9,54 % respectively). 
This result in agreement with most of previous studies, indicating that CAAR will generate 
positive abnormal returns to shareholders of target. We can see that CAAR obtained from 
post-announcement period is higher than pre- and announcement period. This fact shows 
that investors may underestimate the targets during the first two periods. 
 
Figure 10: AAR and CAAR of Targets (-20,+20) 
 
As we can see in Figure 11 the AARs for the Target firms present a big variation, as they 
perform returns from -1,48% until 6,58% for the event window of 41 days. In agreement 
with AARs, CAARs have a huge variation in their stock value especially after day -1 with 
prices from -0,36 until 150,35 per cent. 
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4.2.1.2 Event window of 21 days (-10,+10) 
 
Table 15: CAAR of Targets (-10,+10) 
Time Interval  CAAR(%) t-value 
Pre-announcement Period (-10,-2) 2,06% 0,64 
Announcement Period (-1,0) 5,94% 2,03 
Post-announcement Period (+1,+10) 10,86% 5,08 
 
Based on table 15, CAARs under the three periods seem to be positive .Shareholders of 
targets get positive CAAR of 2,06% during pre-announcement period. The abnormal 
returns are getting higher also in the announcement period and the post-announcement 
period (5,94% and 10,86 % respectively). This result in agreement with most of previous 
studies, indicating that CAAR will turn into positive returns for shareholders of targets. We 
can see that CAAR obtained from post-announcement period is higher than pre-and 
announcement period. This fact shows that investors may underestimate the targets during 
the first two periods. 
Figure 11: AAR and CAAR of Targets (-10,+10) 
 
AARs for Target firms present a small variation, as they perform returns from -4,46% until 
4,20% at the day of announcement, for the event window of 41 days. In contrast with 
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AARs, CAARs have a larger variation in their stock value especially after day -1 with 
prices from 0,55 until 11,49 per cent. 
4.2.1.3 Event window of 5 days (-2,+2) 
 
Table 16: AAR and CAAR of Targets (-2,+2)  
Time Interval  CAAR (%) t-value 
Pre-announcement period (-2) 9,16% -0,08 
Announcement period (-2,1) 15,84% 2,125 
Post-announcement period (1,2) 36,56% 5,36 
 
According to table 16, CAARs under the three periods seem to be extremely positive. 
Shareholders of targets get negative CAAR of 9,24% during pre-announcement period. 
The abnormal returns are getting higher also in the announcement period and the post-
announcement period (15,83% and 39,71 % respectively). 
This result in agreement with most of previous studies indicates that CAAR will generate 
positive abnormal returns to shareholders of target. We can see that CAAR obtained from 
post-announcement period is higher than pre- and announcement period. This shows that 
investors may underestimate the targets during the first two periods as in the previous 
examples. 
Figure 12: AAR and CAAR of Targets (-2,+2) 
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4.2.1 Domestic and Cross-border transactions and their impact on target’s 
shareholders 
4.2.1.1 Event window of 41 days (-20,+20) 
 
Table 17: CAAR of Targets for Cross-border and Domestic M&A deals (-20,+20) 
Time Interval  
CAAR(%) 
Cross-
border 
CAAR(%) 
Domestic 
t-value 
Cross-
borders 
t-value 
Domestic 
Pre- Announcement period (-
20,-2) 1,95% 0,21% 0,14 0,67 
Announcement period (-1,0) -0,47% 0,50% -0,26 0,89 
Post-Announcement period 
(1,20) 101,21% 7,33% 4,24 4,81 
 
Both domestic and cross-border M&A transactions generally generate positive CAARs as 
we can see in Table 17. During pre-announcement period, both cross-border and domestic 
M&As generate CAARs of 1,95% and 0,21% respectively. Nevertheless, they are not 
statistically significant. In the announcement period, shareholders of targets receive -
0,47% CAAR in cross-border M&As and earn 0,50% CAAR if the target companies are 
inside the acquirers’ country. Nevertheless, they are not significantly different from zero. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the country of target companies is not able to impose 
effects on the value of targets’ shareholders during the announcement period and pre-
announcement period. 
Moreover, cross-border M&A deals seem to generate extremely higher abnormal returns 
(101,21%) compared to domestic M&A transactions (7,33%) during post-announcement 
period. Domestic M&A transactions are not being seen as attractive to shareholders of 
targets during this period. Additionally, both of them are significantly different from zero. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the country of target companies impose effects on the 
value of targets’ shareholders during the announcement period and post-announcement 
period. 
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Figure 13: CAAR of Targets for Cross-border and Domestic M&A deals (-20,+20) 
 
As we can see in Figure 13 the CAARs of domestic transactions present a small variation, 
as they perform returns from -0,56 % until 7,49% for the event window of 41 days. In 
contrast with domestic CAARs, cross-border CAARs have extremely bigger variation in 
their stock value among the same period with prices from 0,26  until 173,77 per cent. 
4.2.2.2 Event Window of 21 days (-10,+10) 
 
Table 18: CAAR of Targets for Cross-border and Domestic M&A deals (-10,+10) 
Time Interval  
CAAR(%) 
Crossborder 
CAAR(%) 
Domestic 
t-value Cross-
border 
t-value 
Domestic 
Pre- Announcement 
period (-20,-2) 4,19% -0,19% 0,95 0,31 
Announcement period 
(-1,0) 9,45% 2,05% 3,63 1,51 
Post-Announcement 
period (1,20) 16,29% 5,14% 6,77 3,31 
 
Both domestic and cross-border M&A transactions generally generate positive CAARs as 
we can see in Table 18. During the pre-announcement period, cross-border M&As generate 
CAARs of 4,19 % and -0,19% respectively. Nevertheless, they are not statistically 
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significant. In the announcement period, shareholders of targets receive 9,45% CAAR in 
cross-border M&As and earn 2,05% CAAR if the target companies are inside the 
acquirers’ country. Nevertheless, only CAARs from cross-border deals are statistically 
significant. Therefore, we can conclude that the country of target companies can affects the 
value of targets’ shareholders during the announcement period and pre-announcement 
period. 
Moreover, cross-border M&A deals seem to generate one more time extremely higher 
abnormal returns (16,29%) than domestic M&A transactions (5,14%) during post-
announcement period. Domestic M&A transactions are not being seen as attractive to 
shareholders of targets. Additionally, both of them are significantly different from zero. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the country of target companies impose effects on the 
value of targets’ shareholders also during the post-announcement period. 
 
Figure 14: CAAR of Targets for Cross-border and Domestic M&A deals (-10,+10) 
 
The CAARs of domestic transactions present a small variation, as they perform returns 
from 0,81 % until 6,39% for the event window of 21 days. In contrast with domestic 
CAARs, cross-border CAARs have extremely bigger variation in their stock value among 
the same period with prices from 1,10  until 16,97 per cent. 
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4.2.2.3 Event window of 5 days (-2,+2) 
 
Table 19: CAAR of Targets for Cross-border and Domestic M&A deals (-10,+10) 
Time Interval  
CAAR(%
) 
Domestic 
CAAR(%) 
Cross-
border 
t-value 
Domestic 
t-value  
Cross-
border 
Pre-Announcement eriod 
(-2) 
-0,12% -0,76% -0,26 0,04 
 
Announcement period (-
1,0) 
-0,66% -0,86% -0,95 0,10 
Post-Announcement 
period (1,2) 
-1,35% -1,55% -1,38 0,18 
 
Both domestic and cross-border M&A transactions generally generate positive CAARs as 
we can see in Table 19 During pre-announcement period, both cross-border and domestic 
M&As generate CAARs of 0,38% and 16,97% respectively. Nevertheless, statistically they 
are not significantly different. In the announcement period, shareholders of targets receive 
8,07% CAAR in cross-border M&As and earn 34,12% CAAR if the target companies are 
inside the acquirers’ country. Moreover, they are significantly different from zero. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the country of target companies impose have impact on 
the value of targets’ shareholders during the announcement period and pre-announcement 
period. 
Moreover, domestic M&A deals seem to generate extremely higher abnormal returns 
(59,14%) than domestic M&A transactions (10,66%) during post-announcement period. 
Additionally, both of them are significantly different from zero. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the country of target companies impose effects on the value of targets’ 
shareholders also during the announcement period and post-announcement period. 
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Figure 15: CAAR of Targets for Cross-border and Domestic M&A deals (-2,+2) 
 
CAARs of cross-border transactions present a small variation, as they perform returns 
from -0,02 % until 11,62% for the event window of 5 days. In contrast with cross-border 
CAARs, domestic CAARs have extremely bigger variation in their stock value among the 
same period with prices from 16,78  until 65,87 per cent. 
4.2.3 Methods of payment and their impact to target’s shareholders 
4.2.3.1 Event window of 41 days (-20,+20) 
Table 20: CAAR of Targets and methods of payment (-20,+20) 
Time Interval  
CAAR(%) 
Other  
CAAR(%) 
Cash  
t-value 
Other 
t-value Cash 
 
Pre- Announcement period (-
20,-2) -0,02% -0,81% 1,01 -0,04 
Announcement period (-1,0) 
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Post-Announcement period 
(1,20) 2,85% 11,31% 3,82 4,76 
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 As it is to be seen on the table 20, during pre-and announcement period, all the other 
methods of payment produce negative CAARs for shareholders of targets. In the pre-
announcement period, other methods of payment generate -0,02% CAAR for targets’ 
shareholders, which is statistically insignificant. In the announcement period, M&A 
transactions with cash offer create -1,39% CAAR for shareholders of targets, while other 
methods of payment generates a negative insignificant CAAR of -0,60%. Therefore, 
methods of payment have no impacts on CAARs for shareholders of targets during pre-
announcement period and announcement period. 
During this first (pre-announcement) period, we can find that shareholders of M&A 
transactions, which use other methods of payment besides cash only, seem to be more 
beneficial than those using cash offer. CAARs generated from other methods of payment 
dominate those generated from cash offer. Hence, M&A transactions with cash offer in 
banking sector in the period 2006-2017 do not offer higher abnormal returns to 
shareholders of acquirers as indicated by most of previous studies. 
On the other hand, over the period after M&A announcements are made, the impacts seem 
to be contrary. M&A transactions with cash offer generate extremely positive CAAR for 
shareholders of target firms. However, shareholders of targets participating in transaction 
financed using other methods of payment earn a lower positive CAAR of 2,85%. CAAR 
from M&A transactions with cash offer tends to be higher than those with other offers in 
the post-announcement period, leading to an opposite result to those obtained for pre- 
announcement. In addition, both CAARs are statistically significant. Therefore, methods 
of payment have impact on CAARs for shareholders of acquirers during post-
announcement period also for this event window. 
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Figure 16: CAAR of Targets and methods of payment (-20,+20) 
 
As we can see in Figure 16 CAARs of cash financed transactions present a large variation, 
as they perform returns from -1,94 % until 12,93% for the event window of 41 days. In 
contrast with M&A deal’s CAARs which are financed by other ways of payment (or 
combination of them) and they present a smaller variation in their stock value with prices 
from -2,23 until 6,69 per cent. 
4.2.3.2 Event window of 21 days (-10,+10) 
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t-value 
Other 
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20,-2) 1,52% 2,94% 0,53 0,82 
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Post-Announcement period 
(1,20) 15,35% 3,59% 6,57 2,67 
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During pre-and announcement period, all methods of payment produce positive CAARs 
for shareholders of targets. In the pre-announcement period, other methods of payment 
generate -2,94 % CAAR for targets’ shareholders, which is statistically insignificant. In the 
announcement period, M&A transactions with cash offer create 8,22% CAAR for 
shareholders of targets, while other methods of payment generates a positive insignificant 
CAAR of 2,01%.  
During these first (pre-announcement) period, we can find that shareholders of M&A 
transactions, which use cash as way of methods besides stocks, seem to be more 
beneficial.. CAARs generated from cash payment dominate those generated from other 
way of payment.  
CAAR from M&A transactions with cash offer tends to be higher again than those with 
other offers in the post-announcement period. In addition, both CAARs are statistically 
significant. Therefore, methods of payment have impact on CAARs for shareholders of 
acquirers during post-announcement period also for this event window. 
Figure 17: CAAR of Targets and methods of payment(-10,+10) 
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financed by other ways of payment (or combination of them) and they present a smaller 
variation in their stock value with prices from 0,37 until 6,97 per cent. 
4.2.3.3 Event window of 5 days (-2,+2) 
Table 22: CAAR of Targets and methods of payment (-2,+2) 
Time Interval  
CAAR(%) 
Other  
CAAR(%) 
Cash  
t-value 
Other 
t-value 
Cash 
Pre- Announcement period (-
2) 
21,66% 0,71% -0,29 0,21 
Announcement period (-1,0) 31,01% 7,45% 0,87 4,39 
Post-Announcement period 
(1,20) 
74,36% 12,13% 3,78 8,29 
 
 As can be seen on table 22, during pre-and announcement period, all the methods of 
payment produce positive CAARs for shareholders of targets. In the pre-announcement 
period, other methods of payment generate 21,29% CAAR for targets’ shareholders, which 
is statistically insignificant. In the announcement period, M&A transactions with cash offer 
create 12,97% CAAR for shareholders of targets, while other methods of payment 
generates a positive significant CAAR of 1,34%. Therefore, methods of payment seem to 
have no impacts on CAARs for shareholders of targets during pre-announcement period 
and announcement period. 
During the three periods, we can find that shareholders of M&A transactions, which use 
other methods of payment besides cash only, seem to be more beneficial than those using 
cash offer. CAARs generated from other methods of payment dominate those generated 
from cash offer. Hence, M&A transactions with cash offer in banking sector in the period 
2006-2017 do not offer higher abnormal returns to shareholders of acquirers as indicated 
by most of previous studies. In addition, both CAARs are statistically significant. 
Therefore, methods of payment have impact on CAARs for shareholders of acquirers 
during post-announcement period also for this event window. 
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Figure 18: CAAR of Targets and methods of payment(-2,+2) 
 
As we can see in Figure 18 CAARs of other ways financed transactions present a large 
variation, as they perform returns extremely positive returns from 20,93% % until 83% for 
the event window of 5 days. In contrast with M&A deal’s CAAR which are financed by 
cash and they present a smaller variation in their stock value with prices from 0,71 until 
13,13% per cent. 
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5.Conclusions 
 
This study is consisted of three major objectives. Firstly, we have examined whether ab-
normal returns of bidding companies are significant, like the abnormal returns of target 
firms as well. Secondly, we have sought to compare abnormal returns performed by tar-
get companies with those performed by bidding firms – all deals financed in cash versus 
stock-financed deals. Thirdly, we have examined a potential relationship between abnor-
mal returns and the origin countries of the two companies. This study’s basic outcome 
has been already analyzed in Section 4 (Empirical Results) by investigating the sample in 
three different periods: pre-announcement period (-first day of the event window;-2), an-
nouncement period (-1;0) and post announcement period (+1;+ last day of the event win-
dow). By employing event study methodology, we found the following results: (i) the re-
search reports that abnormal returns of target banks are significantly different from those 
of acquiring banks. In this specific sample of 114 M&A deal announcements, target com-
panies experienced positive abnormal returns independently of transaction’s determi-
nants. (ii) Acquiring companies produced negative, insignificant abnormal returns in 
transactions which are financed by stocks on Day 0 of the announcement (event day). 
Moreover, (iii) acquiring companies produce insignificant positive abnormal returns in 
deals which are financed by cash. 
During the pre- and post-announcement period exist positive and negative cumulative 
abnormal returns respectively for the shareholders of the bidders. However, these num-
bers are not statistically significant. Hence, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis 
and the statement that no abnormal return produced by M&A announcements to bidding 
companies for these two periods. Furthermore, during the announcement period (day 0 
and 1), there exists a insignificant negative cumulative abnormal return for shareholders 
of acquirers. This is fact is not enough itself to indicate that the stock performance of bid-
ding banks in response to M&A announcement in EU is negative. Therefore, M&A an-
nouncements can be characterized as bad news to shareholders of acquirers during all of 
the three periods. 
In the next part of the results’ analysis, we have examined two factors that may have ef-
fects on the shareholder value of bidders. They are cross-border/domestic M&As and the 
methods of payment. In order to examine whether the abnormal returns of acquirers will 
be affected by cross-border or domestic M&As, we calculated separately CAARs that 
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shareholders of acquirers earn when M&A deals are cross-border or domestic. We con-
cluded that during pre-announcement period, there is no significant evidence to report 
that M&A announcements generate abnormal returns for acquirers under both cross-
border and domestic M&A transactions. During the announcement period, cross-border 
M&A transactions create positive and insignificant CAARs for shareholders of acquirers. 
On the other side, domestic M&A transactions generate negative and insignificant ab-
normal returns. Thus, we can conclude that bidders who acquire cross-border target com-
panies can generate bigger positive abnormal returns in contrast to those who acquire 
domestic which seem to generate insignificant negative abnormal returns. In post-
announcement period, cross-border M&A transactions generate a positive insignificant 
CAAR for acquirers while domestic M&A deals generate negative insignificant CAAR as 
well. 
In order to investigate the relationship between methods of payment and abnormal returns 
to shareholders of acquirers, we have split our sample into the “cash” group and “others” 
group. The cash group includes all M&A deals for which acquirers use cash to finance, 
whereas the “others” group includes the other M&A transactions for which acquirers use 
stocks or combination of stock and cash to finance. The result shows that during the pre-
announcement period, transactions using other methods of payment produce positive in-
significant CAAR of transactions, which cash offer is not significant different from zero. 
Announcement period presents again insignificant CAARs for all M&A transactions us-
ing cash and other modes of payment negative and positive respectively. 
Both ways of payment generate positive significant abnormal returns for shareholders and 
other methods of payment seem to create higher value for shareholders. During pre-
announcement and announcement period, none of them generate significant abnormal 
returns for bidders. 
This result supports again the opinion that, indicating that the choice of payment methods 
of acquirers cannot affect the abnormal return generated for shareholders of acquirers in 
pre- and announcement periods. 
 There is no enough evidence to say that M&A announcement will create shareholder 
wealth for acquirers. Cross-border M&A transactions will generate positive abnormal re-
turns for shareholders of acquirers in pre-announcement, announcement period and post-
announcement period, while domestic M&A transactions will create negative abnormal 
returns during the three periods. 
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Methods of payment are not evidenced to effect shareholder’s value. M&A transactions 
finished by other methods of payment (stocks or combination of stocks and cash), share-
holders of acquirers will generate positive abnormal returns during pre- and announce-
ment periods. In contrast with the cash financed transactions which are producing nega-
tive CAAR. 
On the other hand, targets experience totally different the M&A announcement and their 
stocks value seem to be more sensitive to the transactions. During the pre- and post-
announcement period, there produce positive cumulative abnormal returns for sharehold-
ers of targets. However, these numbers are not statistically significant. As a result we are 
not able to reject the null hypothesis and the statement that no abnormal return produced 
by M&A announcements to the target companies for these two periods. Furthermore, dur-
ing the announcement period (day 0 and 1) , there exists a insignificant positive cumula-
tive abnormal return for shareholders of acquirers, higher than the one in pre-
announcement period . But this statement it not enough in order to indicate that the stock 
performance of bidding banks in response to M&A announcement in EU is extremely 
positive. Therefore, M&A announcements can be seen as good news to shareholders of 
acquirers during all of the three periods. 
We examine if the abnormal returns of targets will be affected by cross-border or domes-
tic M&As also for target banks. We conclude that during pre-announcement period, there 
is no significant evidence to report that M&A announcements generate abnormal returns 
for acquirers under both cross-border and domestic M&A transactions. During an-
nouncement period, cross-border M&A transactions create positive and significant 
CAARs for shareholders of target companies at the event window of 5 days. On the other 
side, domestic M&A transactions generate also positive and significant abnormal returns, 
higher than those from cross-border deals. Thus, we can conclude that bidders who ac-
quire domestic target companies can generate bigger positive abnormal returns in contrast 
to those who acquire cross-border which seem to earn significant positive abnormal re-
turns in announcement period. In post-announcement period, both categories M&A trans-
actions generate extremely positive significant CAAR for target firms. 
Examining and the last determinant we conclude that during preannouncement period, 
transactions using all methods of payment produce insignificant CAAR. Announcement 
period presents positive significant CAAR for all M&A transactions using cash and other 
methods of payment. Both ways of payment generate positive significant abnormal re-
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turns for shareholders and other methods of payment seem to create higher value for 
shareholders. During pre-announcement and announcement period, both of them generate 
significant abnormal returns for bidders in the event window of 5 days. On the event 
window of  21 days only cash returns seems to be significant. 
This result is in agreement with the opinion indicating that the choice of payment meth-
ods of acquirers affect the abnormal return generated for shareholders of targets in pre- 
and announcement periods. 
 There is enough evidence to say that M&A announcement will create shareholder wealth 
for targets. Cross-border M&A transactions will generate positive abnormal returns for 
shareholders of acquirers in pre-announcement, announcement period and post-
announcement period, while domestic M&A transactions will generate higher abnormal 
returns during the post-announcement period. 
Methods of payment are not evidenced to effect shareholder’s value. M&A transactions 
finished by both of the payment methods (cash or a combination of other methods) of tar-
gets will generate extremely positive abnormal returns during the three periods. As has 
been already analyzed in Section 4 ,it is undoubtedly true that the CAAR which are per-
formed by target’s stocks are really higher than those which occur by bidder’s stock val-
ue. 
 
5.1 Recommendations for Managers, Investors and Policy Makers. 
 
Keeping the investment perspective in mind, an investor can earn considerable returns if 
he obtain the stocks within five days before the news of M&A comes to the market and 
sells one day after the transaction. An investor can also earn if the shares of the bidding 
firm are purchased two days prior to the announcement day and sold two days after the 
announcement day. We can say that ‘the earlier he sells, the more he gains’ and ‘the issu-
ance of stock is not good news’.  
This study have certain implications for managers and the policy makers as well. Manag-
ers should consider cross-border as more beneficial for target banks and domestic transac-
tions better for the bidding banks. Acquisitions as an option to reinforce their competi-
tiveness as the impact of these deals seem to be a good indicator of longer-term success. 
The study recommends that the European bank managers could adopt M&A as an effec-
tive strategy for corporate growth. The results also bring attention of the managers to the 
 The impact of mergers and acquisitions on shareholders' val-
ue: An empirical analysis of European banks. 
 
67 Emily Charisi 
 
mode of payment of M&A transactions. Publication of stocks is not as good as payment 
in cash as disclosed in market reaction to deals which are financed with stocks.  
The positive returns perceived on announcement and during the pre-event window are in 
agreement with the expectation of the managers. 
Perhaps, this may be due to the fact that firms obtain another firm for a strategic reason, so as to 
utilize the economies of scale and scope, and leverage available resources and capabilities, thus 
generating more scope for value creation. M&A provide an advantage to the bidding firm to 
consolidate and judiciously exploit intangible resources of the two companies on a broader 
scale. It seems that European banks have managed to develop their bidding abilities over time. 
The market responds positively if the deal is considered value-adding to the acquiring firm.  
European banks use cross-border deals for strategic assets seeking in order to facilitate strategic 
and organizational transformation of the firms. Moreover, access  
to developed markets for products, resources, and capabilities enable European banks to leap-
frog to the global league and thus create greater value than what could be achieved by acquiring 
a domestic firm. The cross-border transaction complement the bidding firams with necessary 
technological management expertise and widen customer base to compete in international mar-
kets. 
 
5.2 Limitations and Implications  
 
This research was limited to European banks and financial institutions that have been listed 
at the countries’ Indexes during the announcement (or approval) dates. Firms that had not 
been included in these Indexes at that time of the announcement were exempted from the 
sample since the market statistics could not be specifically determined due to the fact the 
data was not available. This fact leads to the exclusion of a large proportion of the M&As 
that happened, since they are privately owned and therefore stock prices could not been 
calculated. 
Furthermore, another limitation is that this research examined only the short time frame 
after the deal announcement. It would be interesting to look at these corporations after a 
time frame, greater that 20 days after the transactions. There is a high possibility that the 
findings might be different. 
 The impact of mergers and acquisitions on shareholders' val-
ue: An empirical analysis of European banks. 
 
68 Emily Charisi 
 
One more limitation is that the inflation and currency exchange rate, are not taken into con-
sideration. These factors could be affect the value of the transactions and the abnormal re-
turns for bidders and targets which are participating on them. 
Finally, the results of this study have been shaped using the Market Model, and alternative 
models were not taken into consideration. 
5.3 Suggestions for further research 
 
This thesis is based on a simple methodology using the Market Model. For further future 
studies, there is a need to include more independent variables such as the firm size. 
One more suggestion for further research is to examine the long-term returns of the share-
holders. It is assumed that the market takes time to evaluate the effect of a M&A deal. In a 
long-term study, the findings have been highly affected by the model which had been used 
to calculate the abnormal returns. 
Additionally, another factor which would be beneficial to be examined is the motivation 
factors behind the M&A deals for listed banks and institutions.  
Last but not least, previous studies have shown that the attitude of Mergers and Acquisi-
tions could affect the abnormal returns of the acquiring and target companies. Bank mer-
gers in Europe have been characterized by both vertical and horizontal deals. Further stud-
ies may be conducted to examine the impact of the merger or acquisition type. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A' 
 
Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of Acquirers (-20,+20) 
Event 
window  
AAR Acquir-
ers 
T-Statistic 
AAR 
CAAR Acquir-
ers 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
-20 -0,05% -0,12 -0,05% -0,13 
-19 0,12% 0,10 0,07% -0,03 
-18 0,02% 0,14 0,09% 0,01 
-17 0,31% 0,36 0,40% 0,29 
-16 0,44% 0,34 0,84% 0,58 
-15 -0,15% -0,02 0,69% 0,48 
-14 -0,30% -0,17 0,39% 0,30 
-13 0,28% 0,32 0,68% 0,61 
-12 0,32% 0,25 0,99% 0,84 
-11 -0,14% -0,03 0,85% 0,82 
-10 -0,32% -0,11 0,53% 0,64 
-9 -0,30% -0,13 0,23% 0,47 
-8 -0,02% 0,21 0,21% 0,68 
-7 -0,33% -0,24 -0,12% 0,51 
-6 -0,17% -0,13 -0,30% 0,44 
-5 0,10% 0,02 -0,20% 0,48 
-4 0,50% 0,24 0,30% 0,78 
-3 0,19% 0,12 0,50% 0,92 
-2 -0,17% -0,10 0,33% 0,83 
-1 0,13% 0,07 0,46% 1,06 
0 -0,79% -0,52 -0,34% 0,74 
1 0,39% 0,10 0,06% 1,04 
2 -0,35% -0,48 -0,29% 0,82 
3 -0,01% -0,29 -0,30% 0,84 
4 -0,06% -0,36 -0,36% 0,80 
5 -0,74% -0,85 -1,10% 0,33 
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6 -0,30% -0,52 -1,40% 0,20 
7 -0,26% -0,49 -1,66% 0,09 
8 -1,03% -0,85 -2,69% -0,37 
9 -0,48% -0,90 -3,17% -0,78 
10 -0,31% -0,78 -3,48% -0,96 
11 0,44% -0,39 -3,04% -0,80 
12 0,60% -0,34 -2,44% -0,43 
13 -0,07% -0,72 -2,51% -0,46 
14 0,26% -0,45 -2,25% -0,26 
15 0,44% -0,44 -1,81% -0,02 
16 -0,20% -0,73 -2,01% -0,11 
17 -0,71% -1,12 -2,73% -0,54 
18 -0,08% -0,79 -2,80% -0,61 
19 -0,32% -0,72 -3,12% -0,72 
20 0,29% -0,51 -2,83% -0,56 
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Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of Acquirers (-10,+10) 
Event 
Window 
AAR Acquir-
ers 
T-Statistic 
AAR 
CAAR Acquir-
ers 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
-10 -0,20% -0,11 1,30% -0,53 
-9 -0,20% -0,10 -1,35% -0,55 
-8 -0,19% -0,10 -1,40% -0,56 
-7 -0,20% -0,11 -2,13% -0,57 
-6 -0,22% -0,13 -3,26% -0,59 
-5 -0,25% -0,14 -2,56% -0,61 
-4 -0,29% -0,16 -3,04% -0,63 
-3 -0,36% -0,19 -2,73% -0,68 
-2 -0,40% -0,20 -2,43% -0,73 
-1 -0,41% -0,20 -1,15% -0,80 
0 -0,42% -0,20 -0,99% -0,87 
1 -0,40% -0,18 -0,88% -0,92 
2 -0,42% -0,19 -1,37% -1,00 
3 -0,48% -0,21 -2,66% -1,11 
4 -0,53% -0,22 -2,05% -1,26 
5 -0,56% -0,22 -1,67% -1,41 
6 -0,56% -0,19 -1,23% -1,53 
7 -0,62% -0,22 -2,39% -1,72 
8 -0,69% -0,24 -5,13% -1,96 
9 -0,73% -0,25 -4,28% -2,11 
10 -0,82% -0,28 -5,62% -2,21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The impact of mergers and acquisitions on shareholders' val-
ue: An empirical analysis of European banks. 
 
72 Emily Charisi 
 
Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Acquirers (-2,+2) 
Event 
Window 
AAR 
Acquirers  
T-statistic 
AAR 
CAAR 
Acquirers  
T-statistic 
CAAR 
-2 -0,22% -0,11 -0,50% -0,12 
-1 0,12% -0,02 -0,25% -0,14 
0 -0,92% -0,60 -1,47% -0,75 
1 0,29% 0,22 -1,42% -0,55 
2 -0,29% -0,17 -2,04% -0,71 
 
 
Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of Domestic and Cross-border deals (-
20,+20) 
Event 
window 
AAR Cross-
border 
T-Statistic 
AAR 
CAAR Cross-
border 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
AARS 
Domestic 
T-Statistic 
AAR 
CAARs 
Domestic 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
-20 -0,26% -0,28 -0,28% -0,28 0,12% 0,01 0,12% 0,01 
-19 -0,25% -0,10 -0,44% -0,38 0,41% 0,26 0,54% 0,28 
-18 -0,17% -0,13 -0,53% -0,51 0,20% 0,37 0,74% 0,49 
-17 0,46% 0,40 0,01% -0,11 0,17% 0,35 0,91% 0,72 
-16 0,23% 0,29 0,26% 0,17 0,64% 0,41 1,56% 1,02 
-15 0,11% 0,13 0,45% 0,30 -0,37% -0,12 1,18% 0,70 
-14 -0,03% -0,07 0,34% 0,23 -0,51% -0,26 0,66% 0,39 
-13 0,41% 0,41 0,78% 0,65 0,20% 0,30 0,86% 0,65 
-12 0,45% 0,30 1,14% 0,95 0,21% 0,25 1,07% 0,79 
-11 0,14% 0,12 1,35% 1,07 -0,48% -0,21 0,56% 0,53 
-10 -0,92% -0,50 1,42% 0,57 0,24% 0,23 0,80% 0,70 
-9 -0,20% -0,19 1,27% 0,38 -0,36% -0,04 0,43% 0,58 
-8 0,44% 0,63 1,69% 1,00 -0,43% -0,07 0,00% 0,43 
-7 -0,52% -0,21 1,25% 0,80 -0,24% -0,23 -0,23% 0,28 
-6 -0,10% -0,07 1,43% 0,73 -0,26% -0,16 -0,50% 0,16 
-5 0,64% 0,26 1,69% 0,99 -0,21% -0,11 -0,69% 0,06 
-4 0,17% 0,18 1,75% 1,17 0,80% 0,36 0,15% 0,49 
-3 0,13% 0,10 1,95% 1,27 0,21% 0,14 0,37% 0,63 
-2 0,31% 0,24 1,93% 1,52 -0,47% -0,38 -0,12% 0,30 
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-1 0,24% 0,32 2,16% 1,83 0,11% -0,08 0,00% 0,43 
0 -0,28% 0,02 1,66% 1,85 -1,20% -0,90 -1,19% -0,34 
1 0,67% 0,35 2,16% 2,20 0,30% -0,06 -0,89% -0,07 
2 -0,23% -0,03 1,89% 2,17 -0,42% -0,78 -1,30% -0,44 
3 -0,48% -0,26 1,30% 1,91 0,52% -0,23 -0,78% -0,17 
4 0,27% 0,06 1,73% 1,97 -0,31% -0,65 -1,11% -0,32 
5 -0,24% -0,25 1,51% 1,72 -1,17% -1,28 -2,30% -0,98 
6 -0,12% -0,12 1,42% 1,60 -0,44% -0,77 -2,75% -1,15 
7 0,17% -0,01 1,55% 1,59 -0,51% -0,79 -3,27% -1,29 
8 -0,25% -0,18 1,43% 1,41 -1,65% -1,35 -4,97% -2,07 
9 0,03% -0,20 1,48% 1,21 -0,89% -1,41 -5,91% -2,71 
10 0,46% 0,41 1,97% 1,63 -0,98% -1,70 -6,93% -3,48 
11 0,21% 0,08 2,22% 1,70 0,61% -0,59 -6,31% -3,06 
12 0,31% 0,20 2,67% 1,91 0,82% -0,60 -5,45% -2,58 
13 -0,81% -0,51 1,77% 1,40 0,60% -0,73 -4,84% -2,21 
14 0,25% 0,14 2,01% 1,54 0,32% -0,72 -4,50% -1,95 
15 0,18% 0,19 2,15% 1,73 0,57% -0,80 -3,92% -1,71 
16 0,22% 0,12 2,50% 1,85 -0,59% -1,26 -4,52% -2,01 
17 -1,26% -0,86 1,16% 0,99 -0,26% -1,10 -4,75% -2,05 
18 -0,43% -0,34 0,66% 0,64 0,25% -0,98 -4,52% -1,91 
19 0,25% 0,29 0,89% 0,93 -0,79% -1,36 -5,34% -2,28 
20 0,21% 0,12 0,98% 1,05 0,30% -0,85 -5,06% -2,21 
 
 
 
Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Domestic and Cross-border deals (-
10,+10) 
Event 
Window 
AAR 
Cross 
border 
t-
Statistic 
AAR 
CAAR 
Cross-
border 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
AAR 
Domes-
tic 
T-
Statistc 
AAR 
CAAR 
Domestic 
t-
Statistic 
AAR 
-10 -0,07% -0,02 -0,71% 0,16 0,43% 0,08 0,37% 0,08 
-9 -0,04% 0,00 -0,71% 0,19 
-
0,52% -0,20 -0,10% -0,12 
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-8 -0,03% 0,01 -0,70% 0,23 
-
0,40% -0,19 -0,53% -0,31 
-7 -0,08% -0,03 -2,54% 0,24 
-
0,04% -0,14 -0,57% -0,45 
-6 -0,12% -0,06 -3,62% 0,27 
-
0,20% -0,06 -0,73% -0,51 
-5 -0,16% -0,07 -1,21% 0,29 
-
0,41% -0,26 -1,14% -0,77 
-4 -0,23% -0,10 -1,55% 0,29 0,88% 0,41 -0,32% -0,35 
-3 -0,28% -0,11 -0,91% 0,29 
-
0,08% -0,06 -0,36% -0,41 
-2 -0,31% -0,10 0,94% 0,27 0,00% -0,05 -0,33% -0,46 
-1 -0,31% -0,08 1,40% 0,25 0,01% -0,10 -0,31% -0,56 
0 -0,30% -0,05 1,96% 0,24 
-
1,29% -0,71 -1,60% -1,27 
1 -0,31% -0,03 2,16% 0,23 0,06% 0,08 -1,59% -1,18 
2 -0,34% -0,01 1,45% 0,19 
-
0,02% -0,06 -1,60% -1,25 
3 -0,37% 0,00 1,73% 0,13 0,64% 0,24 -0,97% -1,01 
4 -0,37% 0,03 2,44% 0,06 
-
0,77% -0,50 -1,71% -1,51 
5 -0,39% 0,07 3,30% -0,04 
-
1,02% -0,52 -2,74% -2,04 
6 -0,40% 0,13 2,82% -0,07 
-
0,28% -0,07 -3,03% -2,10 
7 -0,45% 0,15 3,19% -0,18 
-
0,91% -0,35 -3,90% -2,45 
8 -0,50% 0,16 0,35% -0,31 
-
1,88% -1,00 -5,86% -3,45 
9 -0,53% 0,20 1,96% -0,43 
-
0,78% -0,40 -6,61% -3,85 
10 -0,56% 0,23 0,95% -0,41 - -0,41 -7,04% -4,26 
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0,41% 
 
Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Domestic and Cross-border deals (-
2,+2) 
Event 
window 
AAR 
Domestic 
T-
Statistic 
AAR  
CAAR 
Domestic 
t-Statistic 
CAAR 
AAR 
Cross-
border 
T-
Statistic 
AAR 
CAAR 
Cross-
border 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
-2 -0,12% -0,25 -0,12% -0,26 -0,33% 0,04 -0,76% 0,04 
-1 0,23% -0,20 0,10% -0,48 0,00% 0,18 -0,51% 0,22 
0 -1,53% -0,94 -1,42% -1,43 -0,26% -0,23 -1,21% -0,01 
1 0,26% 0,23 -1,15% -1,24 0,34% 0,22 -1,20% 0,20 
2 -0,39% -0,28 -1,55% -1,53 -0,18% -0,04 -1,90% 0,17 
 
CAAR of Acquirers and methods of payment (-20,+20) 
Event 
Window 
AAR 
Cash 
T-Statistic 
AAR 
CAAR 
Cash 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
AAR 
other 
T-Statistic 
AAR 
CAAR 
other 
T-
Statistic 
CAAR 
-20 -0,11% -0,21 -0,11% -0,21 0,02% -0,01 -0,06% -0,02 
-19 -0,30% -0,19 -0,41% -0,35 0,58% 0,44 0,47% 0,36 
-18 0,01% 0,07 -0,40% -0,29 -0,06% 0,16 0,34% 0,30 
-17 0,33% 0,33 -0,07% 0,08 0,33% 0,45 0,69% 0,50 
-16 0,10% 0,09 0,03% 0,22 0,90% 0,67 1,36% 1,01 
-15 0,11% 0,15 0,14% 0,37 -0,43% -0,18 0,94% 0,61 
-14 0,09% -0,04 0,24% 0,39 -0,74% -0,31 0,45% 0,20 
-13 0,02% 0,16 0,26% 0,62 0,65% 0,56 1,12% 0,66 
-12 0,60% 0,33 0,86% 0,95 -0,07% 0,14 1,13% 0,74 
-11 -0,18% -0,20 0,68% 0,85 -0,11% 0,18 0,94% 0,83 
-10 -0,81% -0,57 -0,13% 0,37 0,37% 0,54 1,42% 1,09 
-9 -0,25% -0,28 -0,38% 0,20 -0,35% 0,09 1,01% 0,95 
-8 0,06% 0,24 -0,32% 0,49 -0,20% 0,13 0,81% 1,00 
-7 -0,39% -0,36 -0,71% 0,27 -0,31% -0,10 0,50% 0,90 
-6 0,01% -0,03 -0,69% 0,31 -0,33% -0,19 0,13% 0,75 
-5 0,63% 0,32 -0,07% 0,68 -0,59% -0,38 -0,36% 0,33 
-4 0,47% 0,28 0,40% 1,03 0,66% 0,29 0,24% 0,65 
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-3 -0,07% -0,01 0,33% 1,07 0,41% 0,21 0,66% 0,85 
-2 0,07% -0,03 0,40% 1,12 -0,50% -0,22 0,18% 0,56 
-1 0,24% 0,30 0,65% 1,56 -0,01% -0,22 0,19% 0,52 
0 0,02% 0,17 0,66% 1,79 -1,81% -1,38 -1,67% -0,52 
1 0,22% 0,28 0,88% 2,16 0,58% -0,15 -1,06% -0,29 
2 -0,11% -0,27 0,78% 2,02 -0,69% -0,78 -1,76% -0,65 
3 -0,40% -0,26 0,38% 1,90 0,49% -0,35 -1,25% -0,43 
4 0,46% 0,03 0,84% 2,10 -0,64% -0,85 -1,90% -0,76 
5 -0,25% -0,37 0,58% 1,91 -1,43% -1,54 -3,31% -1,63 
6 -1,07% -0,71 -0,48% 1,32 0,65% -0,32 -2,69% -1,17 
7 -0,17% -0,25 -0,66% 1,31 -0,41% -0,87 -3,11% -1,47 
8 -0,25% -0,11 -0,90% 1,33 -2,09% -1,85 -5,26% -2,59 
9 0,03% -0,17 -0,87% 1,28 -1,10% -1,81 -6,44% -3,41 
10 0,55% 0,14 -0,32% 1,59 -1,42% -1,99 -7,96% -4,24 
11 -0,18% -0,34 -0,50% 1,37 1,25% -0,46 -6,66% -3,56 
12 -0,02% -0,15 -0,52% 1,39 1,50% -0,54 -5,06% -2,65 
13 0,06% -0,16 -0,46% 1,44 -0,09% -1,39 -5,15% -2,68 
14 0,21% 0,05 -0,25% 1,59 0,30% -1,15 -4,86% -2,45 
15 0,52% 0,18 0,27% 1,94 0,25% -1,34 -4,62% -2,39 
16 0,14% 0,01 0,41% 2,10 -0,65% -1,73 -5,28% -2,83 
17 -0,19% -0,44 0,22% 1,84 -1,47% -2,10 -6,77% -3,54 
18 -0,16% -0,43 0,05% 1,65 0,02% -1,34 -6,68% -3,49 
19 -0,57% -0,34 -0,52% 1,48 -0,03% -1,27 -6,69% -3,54 
20 0,32% 0,06 -0,20% 1,69 0,21% -1,31 -6,50% -3,48 
 
CAAR of Acquirers by methods and payment (-10,+10) 
Event 
Window 
AAR 
other 
T-
Statistic 
AAR 
CAAR 
other 
T-
Statistic 
CAAR 
AAR cash  
T-Statistic 
AAR 
CAAR 
cash 
T-
Statistic 
CAAR 
-10 0,56% 0,26 0,56% 0,26 -0,90% -0,62 -0,96% -0,62 
-9 -0,49% -0,29 0,06% -0,02 -0,08% 0,04 -0,99% -0,57 
-8 -0,30% -0,03 -0,24% -0,05 0,05% 0,23 -0,98% -0,34 
-7 -0,02% -0,04 -0,26% -0,10 -0,24% -0,16 -1,22% -0,51 
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-6 -0,04% 0,11 -0,30% -0,00 -0,02% -0,02 -1,20% -0,54 
-5 -0,58% -0,35 -0,88% -0,35 0,66% 0,44 -0,54% -0,09 
-4 0,65% 0,41 -0,24% 0,059 0,45% 0,14 -0,15% 0,05 
-3 0,14% -0,01 -0,10% 0,04 -0,03% 0,06 -0,14% 0,12 
-2 -0,41% -0,25 -0,51% -0,20 0,28% 0,22 0,17% 0,35 
-1 -0,60% -0,57 -1,10% -0,78 0,25% 0,27 0,43% 0,62 
0 -1,32% -0,89 -2,43% -1,66 -0,05% 0,18 0,37% 0,80 
1 0,30% 0,09 -2,12% -1,57 -0,06% 0,08 0,27% 0,88 
2 0,11% 0,17 -2,02% -1,40 -0,14% -0,09 0,15% 0,79 
3 0,49% 0,14 -1,53% -1,25 -0,34% -0,05 -0,20% 0,74 
4 -1,01% -0,66 -2,53% -1,92 0,55% 0,30 0,37% 1,04 
5 -1,36% -0,88 -3,89% -2,81 -0,30% -0,20 0,07% 0,83 
6 1,11% 0,83 -2,78% -1,97 -1,08% -0,61 -1,02% 0,22 
7 -0,77% -0,57 -3,55% -2,54 -0,33% -0,07 -1,30% 0,15 
8 -1,98% -1,24 -5,52% -3,79 -0,32% -0,06 -1,71% 0,08 
9 -1,07% -0,79 -6,60% -4,58 0,02% 0,02 -1,66% 0,09 
10 -0,87% -0,57 -7,47% -5,16 0,57% 0,25 -1,11% 0,34 
 
 
CAAR of Acquirers and methods of payment (-2,+2) 
Event 
Win-
dow 
AAR 
Ac-
quires 
Cash 
T-
Statistic 
AAR 
Cash 
CAAR 
acquir-
ers 
Cash 
T-
Statistic 
CAAR 
Cash 
AAR 
acquir-
ers 
Other 
T-
Sta-
tistic 
AAR 
CAAR 
acquir-
ers Oth-
er 
T-
Statistic 
CAAR 
-2 -0,07% 0,07 -0,07% 0,05 -0,51% -0,39 -0,51% -0,39 
-1 0,10% 0,09 0,03% 0,13 0,04% -0,30 -0,48% -0,69 
0 -0,07% 0,02 -0,03% 0,13 -1,95% -1,29 -2,43% -1,99 
1 0,07% 0,08 0,06% 0,17 0,66% 0,42 -1,77% -1,56 
2 -0,14% -0,16 -0,10% 0,00 -0,66% -0,36 -2,43% -1,93 
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Appendix B’ 
 
AAR and CAAR of Targets (-20,+20) 
Event 
window  
AAR 
Target  
T-Sstatistics 
AAR 
CAARS 
Target 
T-Sstatistics 
CAAR 
-20 -0,23% -0,20 -0,36% -0,15 
-19 0,05% 0,09 -0,14% -0,04 
-18 -0,39% 0,05 -0,38% 0,01 
-17 0,62% 0,16 0,64% 0,13 
-16 1,12% 0,43 2,84% 0,53 
-15 -0,44% -0,07 3,34% 0,44 
-14 -0,42% -0,10 3,45% 0,31 
-13 0,12% 0,09 4,30% 0,49 
-12 0,16% 0,10 4,97% 0,59 
-11 -0,44% -0,10 4,90% 0,49 
-10 -1,48% -0,33 3,78% 0,16 
-9 0,52% 0,14 4,69% 0,30 
-8 0,29% 0,08 5,26% 0,34 
-7 0,76% 0,32 6,93% 0,64 
-6 -0,02% 0,05 7,88% 0,66 
-5 -0,69% -0,17 7,54% 0,46 
-4 -0,22% 0,04 7,70% 0,42 
-3 0,99% 0,37 9,61% 0,80 
-2 -0,15% 0,02 10,28% 0,84 
-1 0,49% 0,32 11,63% 1,16 
0 6,58% 2,73 23,94% 3,94 
1 2,35% 1,40 35,11% 5,36 
2 -0,51% -0,18 43,01% 5,19 
3 -0,30% -0,18 50,71% 5,04 
4 0,29% 0,06 59,09% 5,10 
5 0,26% -0,03 67,63% 5,02 
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6 -0,12% -0,10 75,72% 4,93 
7 -0,37% -0,26 83,27% 4,65 
8 -0,66% -0,21 89,99% 4,44 
9 0,21% -0,08 97,58% 4,38 
10 0,09% -0,06 105,00% 4,31 
11 0,37% 0,30 113,18% 4,56 
12 -0,32% -0,33 120,18% 4,43 
13 -0,32% -0,10 126,57% 4,33 
14 0,44% 0,28 133,98% 4,60 
15 0,53% 0,16 142,13% 4,77 
16 0,33% 0,05 150,35% 4,89 
17 -0,64% -0,18 156,73% 4,72 
18 0,08% 0,00 163,57% 4,73 
19 0,12% -0,05 170,49% 4,65 
20 -0,12% -0,03 177,21% 4,64 
 
 
AAR and CAAR of Targets (-10,+10) 
Event 
Window AAR Targets 
T-Statistic 
AAR CAAR Targets 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
-10 -1,57% -0,31 0,55% 0,18 
-9 0,67% 0,22 0,96% 0,33 
-8 0,45% 0,07 1,52% 0,39 
-7 0,70% 0,32 2,44% 0,70 
-6 0,06% 0,13 2,88% 0,81 
-5 -1,58% -0,23 2,24% 0,55 
-4 -1,06% 0,23 2,32% 0,79 
-3 -0,69% 0,32 2,90% 1,06 
-2 -2,40% -0,27 2,73% 0,91 
-1 -1,37% 0,28 2,56% 1,04 
0 4,20% 3,04 9,14% 4,15 
1 -0,07% 1,22 11,49% 5,42 
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2 -2,32% 0,13 11,17% 5,49 
3 -2,70% -0,14 10,94% 5,37 
4 -2,46% -0,02 11,10% 5,36 
5 -3,08% -0,01 11,27% 5,32 
6 -2,98% -0,16 11,20% 5,18 
7 -3,42% -0,28 10,65% 4,88 
8 -4,37% -0,24 9,99% 4,65 
9 -4,46% -0,12 10,15% 4,54 
10 -3,99% 0,10 10,69% 4,63 
 
 
AAR and CAAR of Targets (-2,+2) 
Event window AAR Targets t-Statistic AAR  CAAR Targets t-Statistic CAAR  
-2 0,39% -0,04 9,16% -0,08 
-1 0,08% 0,15 9,33% 0,06 
0 6,82% 4,14 22,34% 4,19 
1 2,91% 1,35 33,41% 5,43 
2 -0,57% -0,08 39,71% 5,29 
 
AAR and CAAR for Targets for Cross-border and Domestic M&A deals (-20,+20) 
Event 
Window 
AARs 
Crossbord
er 
T-
Statistic 
AAR 
CAAR 
Crossborde
r 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
AAR 
Domestic 
T-
Statisti
c AAR 
CAARS 
Target 
T-
Statistic 
CAAR 
-20 0,38% 0,05 0,26% 0,05 -0,73% -0,39 -0,76% -0,33 
-19 0,59% 0,09 1,04% 0,14 -0,31% 0,13 -1,12% -0,20 
-18 -0,22% 0,11 1,48% 0,24 -0,55% 0,02 -1,65% -0,18 
-17 -0,25% 0,00 1,72% 0,24 1,26% 0,29 -0,31% 0,04 
-16 0,50% 0,15 2,74% 0,39 1,68% 0,73 1,41% 0,71 
-15 -0,79% -0,20 2,34% 0,19 -0,10% 0,06 1,32% 0,77 
-14 -0,05% -0,05 2,20% 0,14 -0,72% -0,20 0,57% 0,51 
-13 0,16% 0,13 2,57% 0,28 0,09% 0,01 0,64% 0,73 
-12 -0,38% -0,05 1,84% 0,23 0,64% 0,18 1,28% 0,98 
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-11 -0,06% -0,04 1,45% 0,19 -0,79% -0,14 0,44% 0,80 
-10 -3,41% -0,90 -2,38% -0,70 0,12% 0,13 0,56% 0,97 
-9 1,86% 0,58 -0,32% -0,13 -0,55% -0,14 -0,01% 0,78 
-8 1,24% 0,27 1,66% 0,15 -0,51% -0,05 -0,56% 0,60 
-7 0,65% 0,19 3,12% 0,33 0,86% 0,41 0,31% 1,00 
-6 -0,41% -0,12 3,40% 0,22 0,31% 0,20 0,63% 1,17 
-5 -0,21% -0,03 3,69% 0,19 -1,14% -0,34 -0,53% 0,78 
-4 -0,52% -0,19 3,38% 0,01 0,09% 0,21 -0,46% 0,87 
-3 0,45% 0,38 4,06% 0,38 1,40% 0,32 0,90% 1,21 
-2 -0,91% -0,23 2,74% 0,15 0,50% 0,23 1,37% 1,48 
-1 0,80% 0,44 3,15% 0,59 0,25% -0,01 1,63% 1,72 
0 8,32% 3,03 16,55% 3,63 5,15% 2,00 6,48% 4,09 
1 2,02% 0,88 26,80% 4,51 2,22% 1,51 8,74% 5,68 
2 -0,13% 0,01 34,73% 4,52 -0,77% -0,25 7,96% 5,41 
3 -0,09% 0,01 42,34% 4,54 -0,46% -0,34 7,48% 5,12 
4 0,24% 0,01 50,32% 4,54 0,39% 0,18 7,91% 5,29 
5 0,27% 0,10 59,78% 4,64 -0,31% -0,13 7,60% 5,06 
6 -0,28% -0,11 67,91% 4,53 0,02% -0,11 7,61% 4,97 
7 -0,41% -0,30 75,42% 4,23 -0,35% -0,15 7,25% 4,68 
8 -0,75% -0,29 81,73% 3,94 -0,55% -0,22 6,67% 4,52 
9 0,03% -0,10 89,01% 3,85 0,41% -0,01 7,08% 4,50 
10 0,72% 0,15 97,83% 4,00 -0,48% -0,27 6,59% 4,18 
11 0,59% 0,16 106,21% 4,15 0,65% 0,52 7,26% 4,57 
12 -0,70% -0,16 113,60% 3,99 -0,27% -0,54 6,97% 4,44 
13 -0,89% -0,30 119,23% 3,70 0,14% 0,04 7,10% 4,51 
14 1,11% 0,45 127,44% 4,15 -0,06% 0,13 6,99% 4,63 
15 0,67% 0,11 136,40% 4,26 0,40% 0,20 7,33% 4,83 
16 0,59% 0,11 145,65% 4,36 0,15% 0,02 7,49% 4,98 
17 -1,22% -0,37 151,25% 4,00 -0,09% 0,06 7,41% 4,97 
18 0,17% 0,09 158,03% 4,09 0,05% -0,10 7,44% 4,94 
19 1,00% 0,39 166,79% 4,47 -0,65% -0,43 6,76% 4,45 
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20 -0,50% -0,15 173,77% 4,32 0,25% 0,02 6,97% 4,54 
 
 
AAR and CAAR for Targets for Cross-border and Domestic M&A deals (-10,+10) 
Event 
Window 
AAR 
Crossbord
er 
T-
Statistic 
AAR 
CAAR 
Crossborde
r 
T-
Statistic 
CAAR 
AAR 
Domestic 
T-
Statistic 
AAR 
AAR 
Domestic 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
-10 -2,84% -0,68 1,10% 0,27 -0,26% 0,09 -0,03% 0,09 
-9 1,81% 0,48 2,30% 0,62 -0,50% -0,06 -0,46% 0,03 
-8 1,45% 0,25 3,73% 0,85 -0,58% -0,11 -0,81% -0,09 
-7 0,92% 0,22 4,51% 1,04 0,48% 0,43 0,26% 0,35 
-6 0,84% 0,10 4,97% 1,09 -0,75% 0,17 0,68% 0,51 
-5 0,24% -0,01 5,14% 1,02 -3,45% -0,46 -0,81% 0,06 
-4 -0,14% -0,08 5,02% 0,95 -2,01% 0,56 -0,53% 0,62 
-3 0,57% 0,44 5,26% 1,30 -1,98% 0,19 0,41% 0,81 
-2 -0,45% -0,11 5,70% 1,41 -4,40% -0,44 -0,39% 0,37 
-1 1,12% 0,68 5,62% 1,80 -3,93% -0,13 -0,66% 0,24 
0 7,04% 3,52 13,29% 5,46 1,28% 2,54 4,77% 2,78 
1 2,71% 1,47 16,32% 7,02 -2,94% 0,95 6,39% 3,73 
2 0,02% -0,02 15,80% 6,89 -4,72% 0,28 6,29% 4,01 
3 -0,10% 0,03 16,00% 6,96 -5,37% -0,33 5,61% 3,68 
4 0,25% -0,02 16,35% 6,98 -5,24% -0,03 5,56% 3,65 
5 0,83% 0,09 16,97% 7,01 -7,09% -0,11 5,26% 3,54 
6 -0,19% -0,12 16,85% 6,93 -5,84% -0,21 5,23% 3,33 
7 -0,25% -0,25 16,49% 6,65 -6,69% -0,31 4,50% 3,02 
8 -0,40% -0,09 16,21% 6,58 -8,44% -0,40 3,43% 2,61 
9 -0,49% -0,27 15,88% 6,34 -8,53% 0,04 4,10% 2,65 
10 0,31% 0,01 16,07% 6,34 -8,41% 0,19 5,02% 2,84 
 
AAR and CAAR for Targets for Cross-border and Domestic M&A deals (-2,+2) 
Event 
window 
AAR 
Domestic 
T-
Statistic 
AAR 
Domestic 
CAAR 
Domestic 
t-Statistic 
CAAR 
Domestic 
AAR 
Cross-
border 
T-
Statistic 
Cross-
border 
CAAR 
Cross-
border 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
cross-
border 
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-2 0,75% -0,05 17,17% -0,11 -0,02% -0,04 -0,02% -0,04 
-1 -0,54% -0,27 16,78% -0,37 0,78% 0,63 0,78% 0,54 
0 5,72% 3,56 34,12% 3,13 8,07% 4,81 8,84% 5,39 
1 2,70% 1,17 52,40% 4,10 3,15% 1,56 11,62% 6,97 
2 -0,87% -0,11 65,87% 4,01 -0,23% -0,05 9,70% 6,77 
 
AAR and CAAR of Targets and methods of payment (-20,+20) 
Event 
Window 
AAR 
Other 
T-
Statistic 
AAR 
Other 
CAAR 
Other 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
Other 
AAR 
Cash 
T-Statistic 
AAR Cash 
CAAR 
Cash 
T-
Statistic 
CAAR 
Cash 
-20 -0,30% -0,21 -0,52% -0,07 -0,31% -0,23 -0,21% -0,24 
-19 0,41% 0,18 -0,31% 0,11 -0,23% 0,07 -0,38% -0,15 
-18 -0,25% 0,04 -0,76% 0,15 -0,47% -0,04 -1,03% -0,19 
-17 0,55% 0,20 -0,33% 0,36 0,84% 0,17 -0,25% -0,07 
-16 2,02% 0,86 1,64% 1,18 0,41% 0,12 0,22% 0,04 
-15 -0,67% -0,10 0,53% 1,07 -0,44% -0,12 -0,15% -0,11 
-14 0,04% -0,01 0,41% 1,01 -0,69% -0,14 -0,90% -0,26 
-13 0,56% 0,21 1,16% 1,48 -0,11% 0,02 -1,08% -0,26 
-12 -0,18% 0,15 0,95% 1,63 0,42% 0,07 -0,64% -0,19 
-11 -0,09% -0,04 1,02% 1,57 -0,60% -0,10 -1,31% -0,28 
-10 -3,26% -0,69 -2,23% 0,87 -0,40% -0,08 -1,47% -0,35 
-9 1,09% 0,14 -1,34% 1,05 0,13% 0,18 -1,32% -0,20 
-8 0,62% 0,11 -0,71% 1,05 0,04% 0,05 -1,28% -0,13 
-7 1,17% 0,46 0,52% 1,47 0,61% 0,29 -0,71% 0,16 
-6 0,24% 0,27 0,72% 1,66 -0,16% -0,07 -0,85% 0,11 
-5 -0,70% -0,39 -0,19% 1,18 -0,67% -0,01 -1,54% 0,12 
-4 -0,13% 0,13 -0,17% 1,12 -0,43% -0,10 -1,94% 0,01 
-3 0,50% 0,20 0,35% 1,39 1,35% 0,43 -0,67% 0,41 
-2 -1,41% -0,39 -1,04% 0,97 0,70% 0,30 0,08% 0,75 
-1 -0,40% 0,05 -1,33% 1,04 1,25% 0,59 1,36% 1,33 
0 5,03%   3,42% 3,80 7,37% 2,52 8,79% 3,82 
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1 3,36% 1,92 6,69% 5,78 1,68% 0,75 10,03% 4,59 
2 -0,66% -0,37 5,99% 5,41 -0,56% -0,12 9,49% 4,48 
3 -1,21% -0,64 4,75% 4,77 0,33% 0,15 9,84% 4,67 
4 0,30% 0,15 5,06% 4,89 0,24% -0,02 10,12% 4,68 
5 -0,12% -0,08 4,96% 4,69 0,51% 0,00 10,68% 4,67 
6 -0,46% -0,27 4,37% 4,45 0,14% 0,02 10,81% 4,68 
7 -0,71% -0,39 3,60% 4,01 -0,16% -0,19 10,66% 4,49 
8 -1,39% -0,54 2,29% 3,49 -0,10% 0,02 10,51% 4,51 
9 -0,18% -0,23 2,14% 3,28 0,50% 0,03 11,03% 4,55 
10 -0,62% -0,24 1,53% 3,05 0,69% 0,06 11,65% 4,59 
11 1,45% 0,65 2,99% 3,60 -0,51% 0,03 11,19% 4,60 
12 -0,90% -0,78 2,02% 3,25 0,09% 0,00 11,27% 4,61 
13 -1,35% -0,41 0,60% 2,85 0,55% 0,14 11,76% 4,75 
14 1,15% 0,56 1,78% 3,37 -0,13% 0,07 11,66% 4,84 
15 0,91% 0,40 2,67% 3,77 0,25% -0,04 11,87% 4,82 
16 0,40% 0,00 3,03% 3,87 0,24% 0,09 12,16% 4,94 
17 -1,99% -0,58 0,97% 3,24 0,37% 0,10 12,50% 5,08 
18 -0,18% -0,16 0,80% 3,06 0,30% 0,11 12,76% 5,22 
19 -0,30% -0,22 0,39% 2,82 0,37% 0,08 13,21% 5,26 
20 0,04% 0,00 0,35% 2,85 -0,28% -0,08 12,93% 5,20 
 
 
AAR and CAAR of Targets and  methods of payment(-10,+10) 
Event 
Window 
AAR 
Cash 
T-
Statistic 
AAR 
Cash 
CAAR 
Cash 
T-Statistic 
CAAR 
Cash 
AAR 
Other 
T-Statistic 
AAR Other 
CAAR 
Other 
T-
Statistic 
CAAR 
Other 
-10 -0,14% 0,01 -0,04% 0,01 -3,63% -0,81 1,50% 0,47 
-9 0,56% 0,30 0,45% 0,31 0,98% 0,08 1,78% 0,38 
-8 0,37% 0,00 0,88% 0,31 0,89% 0,19 2,56% 0,54 
-7 0,74% 0,24 1,59% 0,55 1,40% 0,46 3,82% 0,96 
-6 0,55% 0,02 2,01% 0,57 0,78% 0,32 4,30% 1,20 
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-5 -0,49% -0,13 1,63% 0,44 -0,78% -0,39 3,24% 0,74 
-4 -0,16% 0,12 1,47% 0,56 0,42% 0,41 3,69% 1,16 
-3 1,26% 0,47 2,74% 1,03 -0,09% 0,07 3,15% 1,12 
-2 0,18% -0,06 2,94% 0,97 -1,91% -0,62 2,41% 0,80 
-1 1,00% 0,46 3,91% 1,44 -0,45% -0,01 0,37% 0,39 
0 8,56% 3,72 12,52% 5,16 2,51% 1,93 3,65% 2,52 
1 1,79% 0,95 14,28% 6,11 2,83% 1,65 6,97% 4,29 
2 0,27% 0,38 14,47% 6,49 -0,54% -0,29 5,83% 3,86 
3 0,24% 0,19 14,82% 6,68 -1,39% -0,68 4,66% 3,23 
4 0,30% 0,02 15,08% 6,70 -0,21% -0,10 4,64% 3,18 
5 0,55% 0,06 15,67% 6,77 -0,17% -0,12 4,12% 2,97 
6 0,18% -0,04 15,79% 6,73 -0,58% -0,36 3,76% 2,66 
7 -0,12% -0,14 15,66% 6,59 -1,07% -0,51 2,53% 2,12 
8 -0,24% -0,04 15,45% 6,55 -1,51% -0,56 1,14% 1,58 
9 0,41% 0,01 15,89% 6,55 -0,45% -0,33 0,84% 1,29 
10 0,56% 0,02 16,40% 6,57 0,68% 0,22 1,43% 1,49 
 
 
 
 
 
AAR and CAAR of Targets and methods of payment(-2,+2) 
Event 
window 
AAR cash 
t-Statistic 
AAR 
Cash 
CAAR 
Cash 
t-Statistic 
CAAR 
Cash 
AAR 
Other 
T-Statistic 
AAR Other 
CAAR 
Other 
T-
Statistic 
CAAR 
Other 
-2 0,71% 0,21 0,71% 0,21 0,31% -0,29 21,66% -0,29 
-1 1,20% 0,58 1,93% 0,78 -0,92% -0,18 20,93% -0,47 
0 11,05% 7,23 12,97% 8,00 5,05% 2,69 41,09% 2,22 
1 0,57% 0,20 13,13% 8,20 4,36% 1,79 65,71% 4,02 
2 -0,07% 0,19 11,13% 8,39 -1,34% -0,48 83,00% 3,54 
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